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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON SEARCH AND MATCHING EQUILIBRIA
Garth Baughman
Kenneth Burdett
This dissertation considers three separate applications of the theory of search
and matching equilibria. The first chapter considers a partnership formation game,
where agents on two sides of a market need to find a partner before a deadline, and
search frictions make it difficult to find an acceptable partner. I characterize agents
acceptance decisions – those with whom they would be willing to match – show ex-
istence, and provide a condition for uniqueness of equilibrium. This study provides
a step towards a better understanding of matching behavior in non-stationary envi-
ronments where agents have persistent type. The second chapter in this dissertation
considers the import of adverse selection in a modern model of directed search in
labor markets. Competition in this market drives firms to offer contracts that in-
crease over time, limiting turnover. Adverse selection does not perturb contracts
for less attractive types, but leads more attractive workers to accept initially low
wages that grow faster than they would under full information. The final chapter
of this dissertation explores the import of sequential search behavior in a model
of equilibrium price setting by multi-product firms. On the one hand, the market
produces results which affirm the common empirical focus on marginal distributions
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of individual goods’ prices across firms. On the other, when some firms do not offer
every good, search behavior leads to interesting pricing patterns which would not
occur in single-product markets.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Search and matching is the exploration of two related observations. First, before
one can engage in most any economic activity, one must first identify that activity.
One must search. Second, once an opportunity has been identified, all of the parties
to that activity must agree to the terms, and ultimately to participate. One must
match. This basic observation has spawned a large literature, with applications from
the theory of contracts, the analysis of labor markets, to international economics and
trade, or even financial markets and urban and real estate economics. Simply, in any
environment where information is diffuse, good opportunities are rare, and several
agents must come together for success, one must consider search and matching. This
dissertation considers three different applications of the modern theory of search and
matching. The first chapter explores the import of search and matching in a market
for partnership in the presence of a deadline, exploring the interaction of an evolving
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market and individual decisions. The second focuses on the role of information in
a modern model of the labor market. Finally, the third chapter considers retail
markets, exploring the interaction of consumers’ search behavior and firms’ pricing
decisions.
Deadlines and fixed end dates are pervasive in matching markets including school
choice, the market for new graduates, and even financial markets such as the market
for federal funds. Deadlines drive fundamental non-stationarity and complexity in
behavior, generating significant departures from the steady-state equilibria usually
studied in the search and matching literature. In the second chapter, I consider
a two-sided matching market with search frictions where vertically differentiated
agents attempt to form bilateral matches before a deadline. I give conditions for
existence and uniqueness of equilibria, and show that all equilibria exhibit an “an-
ticipation effect” where less attractive agents become increasingly choosy over time,
preferring to wait for the opportunity to match with attractive agents who, in turn,
become less selective as the deadline approaches. When payoffs accrue after the
deadline, or agents do not discount, a sharp characterization is available: at any
point in time, the market is segmented into a first class of matching agents and
a second class of waiting agents. This points to a different interpretation of un-
raveling observed in some markets and provides a benchmark for other studies of
non-stationary matching. A simple intervention – a small participation cost – can
dramatically improve efficiency.
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The second chapter considers a dynamic labor market where workers are pri-
vately informed about their attachment to the labor force and firms competitively
post contracts to direct workers’ search. This extends the static results on adverse
selection in competitive search markets of Guerrieri et al. (2010) to a dynamic en-
vironment with on the job search a` la Shi (2009). Characterizing the dynamic
contracting problem of firms and the search problem of workers, I show that equi-
libria feature full separation, increasing wage profiles, and “job lock” for committed
(long duration) workers, reducing their frequency of transitions relative to a full
information benchmark.
Finally, almost all retailers offer multiple products, and consumers search for
low prices on a basket of goods. Kaplan and Menzio (2014) document a great deal
of price dispersion both within and across stores offering multiple products. The
third chapter extends Burdett and Judd (1983), a canonical model of equilibrium
price dispersion, to the case of multiple products. As shown in Burdett and Malueg
(1981), when sequentially searching for multiple products, consumers (a) face a
lower cost of search per good and (b) may capitalize on low prices for one good
while continuing to search for an acceptable price on the others. This leads multi-
product consumers to set one reservation price for a basket of goods, and a higher
(per good) reservation price for each good alone. This chapter characterizes firms’
pricing decisions in light of this search behavior. In a simple version of the model
where all firms offer every good, the marginal distribution of each price is unique
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and of the same form as would obtain in a simple single product model, and any
joint distribution with support contained in the acceptance set of consumers satisfies
equilibrium. This provides theoretical foundation for the common empirical focus on
marginal price distributions – as only these are determined in equilibrium. While the
structure of equilibrium is unaffected by the addition of single good demanders, the
addition of single good firms can lead to one of several pricing patterns depending on
parameters. A consistent prediction is that, if enough firms can offer only a single
good, these single product firms crowd out the bottom of the price distribution,
with the interesting equilibrium effect of also lowering the highest prices charged by
multi-product firms – an effect which would not obtain in the single product case.
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Chapter 2
Deadlines and Matching
In this paper, I analyze the impact of a deadline, a fixed end date when the market
closes, on equilibrium dynamics in a canonical model of frictional matching. In
the model, search frictions limit the rate at which vertically differentiated agents
meet potential partners. When two agents meet, they each learn the type of their
prospective partner, and hence their payoff from matching. If both agree, the pair
match and leave the market. If not, they continue searching. These exits cause the
distribution of available partners to evolve over time. At the deadline, unmatched
agents receive some outside option and the game ends. I establish existence of
equilibria, provide a condition ensuring uniqueness, and characterize behavior.
Many matching markets feature a deadline. In education, students must find a
seat before the start of the school year. In the market for entry level profession-
als, new graduates want to find a job before graduation. In the market for federal
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funds, banks must meet their reserve requirements before the monitoring dead-
line every evening. When present, deadlines and the consequent cyclical nature
of these markets allows for the implementation of centralized, static mechanisms.
Prominent examples include the medical resident matching program and the school
choice mechanisms in New York and Boston, in addition to somewhat less struc-
tured systems like the signaling mechanism provided by the American Economic
Association’s JOE program.1
The design and analysis of such systems derive from the now prominent liter-
ature on centralized matching, which studies what may obtain when agents come
together to form matches through a common marketplace or clearinghouse.2 A
dual literature, usually termed search and matching, studies incentives and equi-
libria when agents must seek out matches in a decentralized fashion, lacking ready
access to relevant partners. This study applies the decentralized paradigm to mar-
kets with deadlines, providing a positive theory of dynamic behavior in the absence
of clearinghouses – a model of the status quo ante that one can compare to the
successes of centralization.
Consider a decision maker facing a simple search decision problem with a dead-
line after which continued search is impossible. Over time, the decision maker
encounters opportunities that she can either accept, ending search, or reject, giving
1See Roth and Peranson (1999) on medical residents; Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005), Abdulka-
dirog˘lu et al. (2006), and Pathak and So¨nmez (2008) on school choice; and Coles et al. (2010) on
the market for new economists.
2The authoritative introduction being Roth et al. (1992); see Sotomayor and O¨zak (2012) for
a more recent and very concise summary.
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up the opportunity in hopes of finding a better one in the future. As the dead-
line approaches, she has less time remaining to search, and therefore will encounter
fewer opportunities in the future. This leads her to be less selective over time. If
the distribution worsens as time goes on, making good opportunities rarer, this
should further drive her to adopt a declining reservation level, and also to accept
early opportunities. Finally, if she is impatient, with a positive discount rate, pure
preference induces her to accept early opportunities.
This intuitive strategy – where one both accepts some selection of early oppor-
tunities and becomes less choosy over time – holds exactly for the most attractive
agents in a matching market with deadline. Everyone will always accept the most
attractive type, so the most attractive agents need not concern themselves with the
possibility of being rejected by a potential partner; they exactly face the simple
decision problem outlined above. Less attractive agents, however, are not so lucky.
They may be refused by desirable partners, and so must formulate their strategies
in light of the acceptance decisions of others.
In a steady state version of the model, Burdett and Coles (1997) show that
matching sets partition agents into a finite number of classes, disjoint sets of mutu-
ally acceptable types.3 When there is a deadline, one might conjecture that some
flavor of a class system persists. Perhaps some finite number of temporary, time-
3This result was developed across a series of papers each with subtly differing assumptions
including Bloch and Ryder (2000), Burdett and Coles (1997), Chade (2001), Eeckhout (1999),
andMcNamara and Collins (1990). The framework of Burdett and Coles (1997) is the most
similar to mine.
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varying classes obtain. Indeed, a first class exists by exactly the same logic as in
steady state – once one becomes acceptable to the highest type, one is universally
acceptable, so one chooses the same strategy as the highest type. But the dynamics
in the model destroy any hope of summarizing less attractive agents so simply.
The complication derives from an “anticipation effect.” When agents join the
first class, their opportunity sets jump discretely. As different agents anticipate
that they will receive this dramatic improvement in opportunities at different times,
they each follow different strategies, destroying the class system. When impatient,
agents become increasingly choosy as they get close to joining the first class, further
complicating behavior. If there is no discounting, however, the behavior of agents
outside the first is easily described; they do not match at all, preferring to wait for
the opportunity to match with high types later. At each point in time, the market
segments into a first class of matching agents and a second class of waiting agents.
This partitioning has a number of implications. The first concerns sorting. In
the unravelling literature, agents rush the market. Early matching prevents sorting.
Here, because of search frictions, early matching improves efficiency and sorting.
The second implication is that a small flow cost of search is Pareto improving, as it
drives low types out of the market until it is their time to match. This eliminates the
search externality low types exert on high types, and all meetings result in a match.
High types obviously appreciate this, but low types do not mind as a higher match
probability compensates low types for a lower quality of partner, in expectation.
8
The next section considers some important predecessors in the literature. The
following section lays out the basic framework. Section 2.4 presents general results
and is followed by analysis and discussion of the case of patient agents in Section
2.3. Section 2.5 considers the effect of costs on search behavior for patient agents.
The paper then concludes with some discussion.
2.1 Context in the Literature
The current study is a direct extension of Burdett and Coles (1997) as I impose a
deadline on their steady state model. This simple change generates substantially
different behavior than previously analyzed in the literature; specifically, almost no
work considers non-stationary dynamics in a rich search and matching model. Early
predecessors of my paper studied search-theoretic decision problems in a changing
world. These include Van Den Berg (1990) and Smith (1999).4 These studies
hint at the anticipation effect – that one should be willing to wait for promising
opportunities in the future – but these are decision theoretic studies, and the strong
equilibrium implications of anticipation are obscured.
Two other studies are closely related to mine. The first, Afonso and Lagos
(2012), considers a model of decentralized trade before a deadline, and is applied
to the market for federal funds. In their model, all agents hold some quantity
4To the author’s knowledge, the first paper which describes the Bellman equation faced by a
decision maker in a model of non-stationary search was Mortensen (1986). But he immediately
specializes to the stationary case.
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of federal funds and search for a partner with whom to trade, after which they
continue to search for profitable trades until a deadline. They obtain the remarkable
result that, if agents share concave values over final holdings, all meetings result in
trade. In that they characterize the case of repeated trade with transferable utility,
while the current study considers nontransferable utility with only a single trade –
partnership formation – Afonso and Lagos (2012) provides a valuable counterpoint
to the results developed below. The second predecessor, Damiano et al. (2005),
considers a model of partnership formation with nontransferable utility as in the
current study, but differs in that, instead of randomly encountering partners over
time, agents encounter one another over a finite number of discrete rounds. This
leads to dramatically different results when search costs are incorporated, and so I
leave further discussion of this paper to section 2.5.5
Generally, the search literature related to this study can be broken into two
strands. One considers non-trivial matching decisions, but in steady state, and
the other explores non-stationary dynamics, but without meaningful matching de-
cisions. The non-stationary literature is concerned primarily with macroeconomic
fluctuations, and employs search frictions as a means of explaining labor market dy-
namics.6 In order to keep the state space small, heterogeneity is either completely
idiosyncratic, or absent. In steady state, there is a large literature addressing equi-
5This discrete time matching framework has also been considered in the theoretical biology
literature, see Alpern et al. (2005) for results which expand upon the Damiano et al. (2005)
framework, and summarize previous work in that other literature.
6Rogerson et al. (2005) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011) survey the literature.
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librium matching behavior. Prominent examples include Burdett and Coles (1997)
and Shimer and Smith (2000). The restriction to steady state allows for a careful
consideration of the matching decisions of heterogeneous agents, but that restriction
precludes analysis of the effect of a changing environment on equilibrium interac-
tions at the heart of the current study.
There are but a handful of recent advances towards reconciling non-stationarity
and heterogeneity. Rudanko (2011) and Menzio and Shi (2011) assume agents can
direct their search, only meeting the partners for whom they actively search. This,
coupled with a free entry condition, dramatically simplifies the firms’ side of the
market, allowing for a clean characterization of behavior. Coles and Mortensen
(2012), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2013), and Robin (2011) take a different tack,
each showing that a different restriction on the contracting space can simplify the
movements of individuals across jobs, affording sharp results. Instead, the current
study makes a stark assumption on the nature of non-stationarity – the deadline
– and focuses on matching decisions exclusively, eliminating the complications of
contracting by instead assuming non-transferable utility. This allows the current
study to offer a clean description of matching behavior, highlighting the equilibrium
forces underlying non-stationary matching problems more broadly.
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2.2 The Framework
The framework is a non-stationary extension of Burdett and Coles (1997). Two
groups of agents, say workers and firms, attempt to find a partner from the other
side. At time zero, the market is populated with equal masses of workers and firms
measuring size N0. Instead of explicitly modeling the process by which the two
sides evaluate each other, assume that individuals can be characterized by a fixed
real number which, following Burdett and Coles (1997), is termed pizazz. This is
a vertically differentiated market. Agents’ pizazz are initially distributed according
to G0(z) with support X = [x, x] ⊂ (0,∞). Time flows continuously from zero up
to T > 0. During this time, agents search for partners from the other group. Each
agent encounters a potential partner at a constant rate α > 0.7 Upon meeting,
two agents observe each other’s pizazz and simultaneously decide whether or not
to propose a match. For a match to occur, both agents in a meet must propose.
Utility is non-transferable; the value to an agent with pizazz y of matching with an
agent of pizazz x is exactly equal to x, irrespective of y.8 Once matched, agents
leave the market (there is no recall or divorce).
If, upon reaching time T , an agent remains unmatched, they receive utility from
7Which one could rationalize with a constant returns to scale meeting function.
8It is not clear whether this is a restriction above and beyond the requirement of identical
time-valued VNM preferences. Indeed the analysis goes through equally well if agents receive a
general payoff f(x, y) so long as this is multiplicatively separable, increasing, and strictly positive.
Additive separability may also be accommodated when agents are patient and do not discount.
Eeckhout (1999) and Smith (2006) allow for type-dependent preferences and show that all that is
required for a class system to obtain in a stationary framework is identical static VNM preferences
across agents, which implicitly allows different discount factors. This paper will not allow for
differences in discount rates, and so assumes identical cardinal preferences from the outset.
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an outside option, the value of which is 0. That all agents share a uniform outside
option is not without loss of generality and represents a significant simplification.
The strongest implication is that all agents prefer matching with even the least
attractive agent to taking the outside option. In addition to a declining probability
of meeting (because time is running out), agents may be impatient and discount
the future at a rate r ≥ 0.
Suppose that agents flow into the market at a rate ζ(t) ≥ 0 which is bounded
above by some ζ¯ and that the distribution of the inflowing agents is H(z, t) with
support contained in X. Let G(z, t) be the distribution of pizazz at time t (reflecting
changes due to both inflows and outflows). Further, write N(t) for the mass of
agents at time t so that N(t)G(z, t) is the mass of agents of pizazz less than z at
time t.
Since an agent x may not receive a proposal from every meeting, write α(x, t) for
the (possibly time varying) arrival rate of proposals and Gx(z, t) for the distribution
of agents who would propose to x upon meeting. Write
Ω(x, t) = {y|y is willing to propose to x}
and
A(x, t) = {y|x is willing to propose to y}
and call these the opportunity and acceptance sets, respectively.
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With the basic elements in hand, write U(x, t) as the (Bellman) value at time t
for an agent of pizazz x. Focus on symmetric cutoff strategies where agents accept
any partner with pizazz greater than or equal to his or her current value.9 Standard
arguments then yield the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the
agent’s reservation value.10
U˙(x, t) = rU(x, t)− α(x, t)
∫ x
U(x,t)
(z − U(x, t))Gx(dz, t)
with boundary condition U(x, T ) = 0. This states that, as agents wait for a match,
the change in their reservation value is given by the asset value of their future
opportunities, less the excess value of current matches which did not materialize.
Integration by parts gives a more convenient formulation:
U˙(x, t) = rU(x, t)− α(x, t)
∫ x
U(x,t)
(1−Gx(z, t))dz. (2.2.1)
Given that agents use cutoff strategies, we have the following.
Remark 2.2.1. Since x will accept any y ≥ U(x, t) we haveA(x, t) = {y|y ≥ U(x, t)},
Ω(x, t) = {y|x ≥ U(y, t)}, α(x, t) = α ∫
Ω(x,t)
G(dz, t) and
9Cutoff strategies are the only weakly undominated ones, and restricting attention to cutoff
strategies removes pathological equilibria such as ‘everyone always rejects.’ Moreover, it is a strong
symmetry assumption – all x type firms play the same strategy as all x type workers. Symmetry
within a group is not binding. While I prove existence of equilibria with symmetry across groups,
there may exist asymmetric equilibria even with symmetric initial data, but this is left for future
work.
10This equation was first derived in search theory work by Mortensen (1986). His analysis was
later expanded to consider more general kinds of time variation by Van Den Berg (1990).
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Gx(z, t) =
∫
Ω(x,t)
1 {y ≤ z}G(dy, t)∫
Ω(x,t)
G(dy, t)
.
This allows one to write α(x, t)
∫
f(z)Gx(dz, t) = α
∫
Ω(x,t)
f(z)G(dz, t), for any
integrable f , which will be used extensively. In particular, it implies that one’s
decision problem depends only on the time path of one’s opportunity set.
With the individual’s problem defined, the last step in the setup of the model
is to derive the dynamic for G. Write θ(x, t) for the probability that a meeting will
result in a match for an agent with pizazz x,
θ(x, t) =
∫
A(x,t)∩Ω(x,t)
G(dy, t),
so that the exit rate for an agent of pizazz x is αθ(x, t). Supposing, momentarily,
that G(z, t) and H(z, t) possess densities g(z, t) and h(z, t), the number of agents
with pizazz z in the market at time t is n(z, t) = N(t)g(z, t). The number of agents
with pizazz z leaving the market is αg(z, t)θ(z, t)N(t) and the number entering
is ζ(t)h(z, t). This gives n˙(z, t) = −αθ(z, t)g(z, t)N(t) + ζ(t)h(z, t), and, after
integrating, N˙(t) = −αN(t)E(θ(x, t)) + ζ(t). Writing η(t) = ζ(t)/N(t), and noting
that g˙ = [n˙N − nN˙ ]/N2, one observes
g˙(z, t) = αg(z, t)[E(θ(x))− θ(z)]− η(t)[g(z, t)− h(z, t)].
This can be read as saying that, if a given agent’s probability of being matched is
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greater than average, their relative numbers tend to decline (the first term) unless
the entrance of new agents more than compensates (the second term). Integrating
again gives the dynamic for G.11
G˙(z, t) = αG(z, t)[E(θ(x))− E(θ(x)|x ≤ z)]− η(t)[G(z, t)−H(z, t)]. (2.2.2)
With the framework in hand, consider now the general properties of the model.
2.3 Patient Agents
In our motivating applications, agents receive their payoff after the market closes,
so it is appropriate to assume no discounting, r = 0. For example, an academic
economist does not start working until several months after the end of the search
process, and universities do not receive services until that time. Moreover, the
case of r = 0 strongly highlights the anticipation effect and produces a tractable
equilibrium characterization: highly attractive agents, following the intuitive strat-
egy alluded to in the introduction, become less selective as time ticks on and low
type agents prefer not to match early in the market, instead waiting until highly
attractive agents will accept them.
Since this case is relatively uncomplicated, I keep the analysis in this section
informal, leaving most formal results for the next section. The first step in the
11Which holds whether or not G and H possess densities, the above derivation being only for
the purposes of exposition.
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characterization is to notice that when there is no discounting, reservation values
can never rise over time. If there is a high value available in the future, patient
agents will simply wait for it rather than accepting less attractive options today.
Lemma 2.3.1. U(x, t) is weakly decreasing in t when r = 0.
Proof. Recall equation (2.2.1) and substitute r = 0,
U˙(x, t) = −α(x, t)
∫ x
U(x,t)
(1−Gx(z, t))dz ≤ 0.
Next, a bound on the value of the highest type obtains. Suppose x were alone in
a market exclusively populated with the most attractive agents who are all willing
to match. The value in this market is simply equal to the probability of matching
(1− exp{−α(T − t)}) times the value of matching with the highest type (x). This
rosy scenario gives a bound on the reservation value of the highest type in any
equilibrium:
U(x, t) < Uˆ(t) ≡ x(1− exp {−α(T − t)}).
This implies that, at time zero, at least all agents with x ≥ x(1 − exp {−αT})
are acceptable to x. Further, all agents become acceptable to x at some point
(because x > 0 = U(x, T )). Define the set acceptable to x as the first class:
F(t) = {x ≥ U(x, t)}. The time when one joins the first class is important. Define
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these hitting times as τ(x) = min{t ∈ [0, T ]|U(x, t) ≤ x}, so that τ(x) is the time
when x becomes acceptable to x (and they remain acceptable because of Lemma
2.3.1).
Being acceptable to x has an important implication. If t ≥ τ(x), so that x is
acceptable to x, then U(x, t) = U(x, t): If one is acceptable to x for all future time,
one is acceptable to all other agents into the future.12 Then, since values depend
only on opportunity sets, one’s expected value from search is exactly the same as
x.
This has a strong equilibrium implication: no one outside the first class matches.
At τ(x), x gets a partner of his or her own pizazz in expectation: U(x, τ(x)) = x
because U(x, τ(x)) = U(x, τ(x)) = x. Moreover, U(x, t) ≥ x for t < τ(x) by Lemma
2.3.1. Finally, it can also be shown that U(x, t) ≤ x. That is, one is always willing
to accept a partner of equal pizazz.13 These, then, give U(x, t) = x for t < τ(x),
and all behavior is driven by the value of the highest type. This is summarized in
the following proposition and illustrated in figure 2.1.
Proposition 2.3.2. When r = 0, U(x, t) wholly determines the equilibrium as
U(x, t) =

x if t < τ(x)
U(x, t) if t ≥ τ(x).
Suppress time arguments and write U¯ = U(x, t), the dynamic for G simplifies to
12Which assumes monotone reservation values, proved in by Corollary 2.4.5 below
13Which is proved formally in Corollary 2.4.6 below.
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Figure 2.1: Reservation Values when r = 0
G˙(z) =

αG(z)[1−G(U¯)]2 − η(t)(G(z)−H(z)) if z < U¯
αG(U¯)[1−G(U¯)][1−G(z)]− η(t)(G(z)−H(z)) if z ≥ U¯ .
(2.3.1)
Proof. The specification of U derives from the discussion above. The relatively
explicit form for G˙ derives from the fact that θ(x, t), the probability of a meeting
resulting in a match, collapses to a step function:14
14There are other possible dynamics if G contains atoms. In this case, the agents with positive
mass are indifferent between matching with each other or not before τ(x). This dynamic assumes
that they do not. This form would dissolve otherwise. Indeed, if there were some finite set of
pizazz levels, then the anticipation result dissolves to some extent, as one equilibrium would be
for all agents to match with equal pizazz agents before joining the first class. This is resolved
by the introduction of avoidable search costs, which induce second class agents to stay home as
described below.
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θ(x) =

(1−G(U¯)) if x ≥ U¯
0 if x < U¯
To reiterate, low types wait, with reservation value equal to their own type,
until they become acceptable to the highest type, after which they share a value
function with the highest type. The notion that patient agents should only match
with their own type is perhaps not surprising. If one were to consider the limit of
the Burdett-Coles economy as the discount rate goes to zero, the classes shrink to
the point where each type is in their own class. That the introduction of a deadline
leads to growing desperation is also unsurprising. The unobvious contribution is
that that the interaction of these two considerations leads to equilibrium behavior
that admits such a straightforward summary. Straightforward, however, should not
be mistaken for simple, as the reservation value for x encodes all of the subtleties
of an evolving distribution, weighing off the value of matching today against the
possibility of remaining unmatched or facing poor opportunities in the future.
Because of the clear characterization available when agents are patient, another
important result obtains:
Proposition 2.3.3 (Uniqueness). If there is no entry (η = 0), agents are patient
(r = 0), and G0 is continuous, then the equilibrium is unique.
The proof is relegated to the appendix, but derives mostly from a careful con-
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sideration of the dynamics of the distribution in light of the equilibrium character-
ization from Proposition 2.3.2. Briefly, if one increases the initial reservation value,
high types filter out for some period before the reservation falls back to the original
level. This leads to a relatively flat path in the future. Hence, a high initial value
leads to a high terminal value – only one path can satisfy the boundary condition.
In the context of the job market, that the best candidates match earliest fits
common experience, is alluded to in Roth and Xing (1997) in the context of the
market for clinical psychologists, and is a model prediction in Damiano et al. (2005)
(when there are no costs) and Burdett and Coles (1997) (because higher agents are
in larger classes). That low pizazz agents have no strict incentive to match early in
the market reflects optimal waiting. At τ(x), the fact that many high type agents
may have left is irrelevant. U(x, t) hits x exactly when the value of being in the first
class equals x. The (possibly small) probability of matching with very attractive
agents offsets the probability of only meeting agents without much pizazz, or having
no future meetings at all.
2.4 General Results
This section provides results concerning existence and characterization of equilibria
for any discount rate r ≥ 0. In the job market for entry-level professionals, one
might think of r > 0 as pure impatience, wanting to know sooner rather than later.
Alternatively, r might represent the flow probability of a tragic event – the death
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of a relative, say – which would cause an agent to quit searching and abandon the
market. One has a preference for securing an early match because it resolves this
risk. When r > 0, the model exhibits rich behavior. But, before exploring this,
note that behavior in the presence of discounting limits to the simpler behavior
described above as r → 0.
Proposition 2.4.1. As r → 0, the discounting equilibrium converges to the no-
discounting equilibrium.
The complication when r > 0 derives from early matching among less attractive
agents. But as r → 0, this early matching dissolves, and so even if agents are
impatient, so long as the duration of the market is short and matching rates are
high, early matching has little impact on equilibrium.
Turning now to existence, given the focus on cutoff strategies, an equilibrium
is any pair U,G which simultaneously solve (2.2.1), the Bellman equation, and
(2.2.2), the differential equation for G, subject to U(x, T ) = 0 and G(z, 0) = G0(z).
No restrictions are required on the initial distribution of pizazz in order to obtain
existence. This derives from the fact that equilibrium is not required to exist in
steady state; the only requirement is that agents correctly predict the time path of
the distribution of pizazz when making matching decisions, and that these matching
decisions generate the predicted time path. All omitted proofs can be found in the
appendix.
Proposition 2.4.2 (Existence). There exists an equilibrium for any r ≥ 0.
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The proof is closely related to that in Smith (2006) with the exception that one
instead solves for a whole time path for each object. This leads to significant al-
teration of the “Fundamental Matching Lemma” which instead relies on arguments
from the theory of Banach ODE.
When agents discount, expected present values can rise or fall over time – Lemma
2.3.1 does not hold. Specifically, the reservation value of the highest type can rise
over time if the distribution improves sufficiently. This can occur either because high
types enter or because low types match and exit. Hence, an agent who is acceptable
to the highest type at a point in time need not be in the future, and so need not
share the highest type’s reservation. As in the case of r = 0, equilibrium revolves
around the existence of a first class of agents who share the same reservation. Now,
however, the first class does not consist of those acceptable to x at a point in time.
Instead, say an agent is in the first class if they are universally acceptable now and
forever. That is:
Definition 2.4.3. Let F(t) = {x|∀s ≥ t,Ω(x, s) = X}, and call this set the First
Class.
Before we can characterize the first class and the behavior of first class agents,
some intermediate results are required. The first states that higher types have more
opportunities, which follows from cutoff strategies.
Lemma 2.4.4 (Monotone Opportunity Sets). If x1 ≤ x2 then Ω(x1, t) ⊆ Ω(x2, t),
and α(x1, t) ≤ α(x2, t) for all t.
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This observation yields another intermediate result towards characterizing the
first class. Because opportunity sets are increasing in type, so are reservation values.
Corollary 2.4.5 (Monotone Values). For all t, U(x, t) is increasing in x, and
Ω(x, t) is connected.
Given monotone values, a simple upper bound obtains, yielding the intuitive
result that agents are always willing to accept their equals:
Corollary 2.4.6. U(x, t) ≤ x for all x, t.
Proof. If an agent, x, has a value higher than his own pizazz, some other agent with
higher pizazz y > x must be willing to match with him (if not today then at some
point in the future). But that would imply x ≥ U(y, t) ≥ U(x, t). Discounting this
observation backwards yields the result.
From these points one notices what is a general property of models with non-
transferable utility and common preferences.
Remark 2.4.7. The model delivers Positive Assortative Matching at each point in
time in the set-valued sense of Shimer and Smith (2000): the upper and lower
bounds on the matching set are weakly increasing everywhere.
Because of monotonicity in opportunity sets, the time when one is universally
acceptable going forward is exactly the same as the time when one is acceptable to
the highest type. This allows for the first class to be formulated in a manner similar
to the last section, but allowing for the possibility of non-monotonicity. One does
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not join the first class immediately upon becoming acceptable to the highest type.
Instead, one joins the first class when one becomes acceptable to the highest type
forever.
Remark 2.4.8. F(t) = {x|x ≥ sups≥t U(x, s)} by Lemma 2.4.4.
Not only is one always acceptable to one’s equal, the assumption that U(x, T ) =
0 implies that every agent is eventually universally acceptable. As in the no dis-
counting case, all agents eventually join the first class.
Lemma 2.4.9. For every agent, x, there exists τ(x) < T with τ(x) = inf{t|x ∈
F(t)}.
Proof. At time T , everyone is willing to match with everyone else because x > 0 =
U(x, T ). That there exists ε > 0 such that the same holds for all t > T − ε follows
from boundedness of U˙ . And, as one’s value depends only on the future path of one’s
opportunity set, if Ω(x, t) = X = Ω(x, t) for all t ≥ τ(x), then U(x, t) = U(x, t) for
all t ≥ τ(x). But τ(x) is precisely the moment when x joins Ω(x, t). Hence, it is
the precise time when x = U(x, t). Thus, U(x, τ(x)) = x.
These all together complete the description of the first class. The first class
consists exactly of those who are permanently acceptable to the highest type, and
all agents join the first class before the deadline. This leads to an analogue of
Proposition 2.3.2 for the case of discounting.
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Lemma 2.4.10 (First Class Values). All first class agents share the same value: If
t ≥ τ(x), U(x, t) = U(x, t) and, specifically, U(x, τ(x)) = x.
Proof. That U(x, t) = U(x, t) for t ≥ τ(x) follows from simple inspection of the
Bellman equation given that Gx(·, t) = G(·, t) = Gx¯(·, t) and α(x, t) = α = α(x, t).
And then, that U(x, τ(x)) = x follows from Remark 2.4.8.
The intuition is the same as in the case of no discounting. Once one has joined
the first class, one is universally acceptable going forward, by definition. One’s
problem is wholly defined by the time path of one’s opportunity set. If two agents
share the same opportunity set going forward, as they have the same preferences,
they must make the same decisions and have the same value. Since all agents
are eventually universally acceptable, they eventually all share the same value.
Moreover, agents smoothly filter into the first class as the deadline approaches and
the highest type becomes less and less selective. The fact that all agents eventually
share a value function dramatically simplifies the analysis.
Note that it is here where the joint assumptions of common preferences and a
common outside option truly bind. If one were to dispense with either of these, this
sharp result would dissolve. Indeed, even with these, equilibrium still fails to admit
any simple representation with some finite number of classes:
Remark 2.4.11. There do not exist persistent coincidences of matching sets outside
the first class. Second class agents become increasingly selective before they join
the first class: limt↗τ(x) U˙(x, t) = rx.
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Because different agents expect to be able to get their own pizazz at some point
in the future, there can be no persistent coincidence of matching sets for different
pizazz levels with τ(x) > 0. Indeed, the only class in the sense of Burdett and Coles
(1997) consists of exactly those agents with τ(x) = 0. If x has τ(x) = 0, then x
expects to be able to match with all agents at any point in the future. Hence, their
problem is identical to that of x. These agents all share the same value, U(x, t),
across the whole time path; share the same matching set; and are always willing
to match with each other. But, unless all agents fall into this class, one can not
capture equilibrium behavior with any finite set of reservation values.
One might infer from the proof of Lemma 2.4.9 that low pizazz agents join the
first class only ε-time before T . This is not the case as one can see from a bound
on the reservation value of the highest type.
Lemma 2.4.12.
U(x, t) ≤ Uˆ(x, t) = α
r + α
x(1− exp{−(r + α)(T − t)}),
and so
τ(x) ≤ τˆ(x) = T +
(
1
r + α
)
log
[
1− x
x
(
1 +
r
α
)]
.
Proof. The bound on U derives from considering the value obtained if x were in a
market with only other x pizazz agents: solve
˙ˆ
U(x, t) = (r + α)Uˆ(x, t) − αx, with
Uˆ(x, T ) = 0. The bound on τ(x) comes from solving Uˆ(x, τˆ(x)) = x for τˆ(x).
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This implies that the first class consists of at least all agents with τˆ(x) = 0,
those agents with x ≥ Uˆ(x, 0). Moreover, one can say (independent of T ) that all
agents are in the first class from time zero whenever
x
x
< 1 +
r
α
.
For matching not to be universal, the ratio between the highest and lowest pizazz
levels can not be too tight compared to the matching friction, as measured by r/α.
As mentioned in Remark 2.4.11, reservations are increasing for agents just before
they enter the first class. And, since τ(x) is continuous in x, agents who expect
to join the first class near time zero have increasing reservations from the very
beginning. Hence, lower agents have decreasing matching opportunities before they
enter the first class as more attractive agents become increasingly selective before
they join the first class. This, on the one hand, tends to drag down less attractive
agents’ reservations as their early matching opportunities dry up. On the other
hand, as time goes on, agents move closer to joining the first class, which pushes
up reservations. An integral of U makes this clear:
Remark 2.4.13. If one writes y(x, t) = sup{y ∈ Ω(x, t)}, then Ω(x, t) = [x, y(x, t)]
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and
U˙(x, t) = r
xe−r(τ(x)−t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+α
∫ τ(x)
t
e−r(s−t)
∫ y(x,s)
U(x,s)
(G(y(x, s))−G(z, s))dzds︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

− α
∫ y(x,t)
U(x,t)
(G(y(x, t))−G(z, t))dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
(2.4.1)
The expression derives from substituting U(x, τ(x)) = x into an integral of the
Bellman equation and then substituting the result into the definition of U˙ . The
first term, A, is the discounted contribution of the expectation that x will join the
first class at time τ(x). The second, B, is the discounted contribution of future
excess value of matching opportunities to current utility. The last, C, is the current
excess match value. So, the change in reservation is given by the asset value of
not matching, r times A plus B, less the expected value of the missed opportunity
today, C. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Suppose there is some agent x with τ(x) > 0 and for all agents z > x and
times t < τ(z), U˙(z, t) > 0. Then y(x, t) is strictly decreasing over time.15 Hence,
matching opportunities are declining for x. This is reflected in C being large relative
to B. So, if τ(x) is far off, A might also be small and so values would be declining.
Or, with τ(x) close, A might be large relative to C, yielding increasing values. In
general, values might be increasing or decreasing for different agents before they join
15And there exists some such x because for all z, U˙(z, τ(z)) = rz > 0.
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Figure 2.2: Value when r > 0
the first class (and then either increasing or decreasing thereafter). A condition,
however, is available which guarantees that even the least attractive agents have
increasing reservations over the whole period.
Lemma 2.4.14. Write
λ(σ) =
[
1− x
x
(1 + σ)
](− σ1+σ )
e−rT .
If
(
1 +
r
α
)
λ
( r
α
)2
> 1
then for all x with τ(x) > 0, U˙(x, t) > 0 whenever t ≤ τ(x).
While the proof is left for the appendix, it relies on using the bound on τ(x)
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from Lemma 2.4.12 to give an upper bound for y(x, t) and evaluating the matching
opportunities if x could match with y(x, t) with rate α; hence the bound does not
depend on the distribution of agents and is relatively weak.
Note that the result holds vacuously if (x/x) < 1 + (r/α) where all agents are
always in the first class. But, there do exist parameters for which the result holds
meaningfully because, for example, limr→0(1 + (r/α))λ(r/α)2 = 1 and
lim
r→0
∂
∂r
(
1 +
r
α
)
λ
( r
α
)2
=
1
α
(
1− 2αT − log
(
1− x
x
))
> 0
for x/x large relative to T . For some parameter values, unattractive agents should
all become more choosy over time before joining the first class.
Also, note that the definition of τ(x) can not be simplified: the reservation
value of the most attractive agent need not be monotone. As the model allows for
arbitrary inflows, this is somewhat obvious. What may be less obvious is that the
highest types may become more selective even without inflows because matching
behavior of lower types can improve the aggregate distribution. If, for instance,
there is a relatively large population of low types, then they match out relatively
quickly. This improves the distribution over time. If match rates are high and
agents relatively impatient, this leads to an increasing value for the highest types.
This is closely related to non-uniqueness in the r > 0 case.
The intuition for multiplicity is as follows: If a high pizazz agent, x, expects that
other highly attractive agents will match quickly, leading to a poor distribution in
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the future, then x will lower his reservation value in the present, leading to a higher
rate of exit. Alternately, if x expects the distribution to stay relatively stable, he is
more patient, yielding a stable distribution.16 This kind of multiplicity seems closely
related to the thick markets externality described in Burdett and Coles (1997) which
dates back to Diamond (1982), but the non-stationarity of the current environment
adds a different flavor.
2.5 Unravelling and Costly Search with Patient
Agents
In the market for entry-level professionals, many studies describe unravelling – an
incentive to rush the market (e.g. Roth et al. (1992), Roth and Xing (1997), Li
and Suen (2004)). The equilibria presented above do not feature this rushing of
the market. Instead, agents wait patiently, smoothly filtering into the first class.
To some extent, this is purely technological. The matching technology prevents a
complete rushing of the market, as agents only occasionally meet a potential partner.
But it is the strategic implications of search frictions that prevent unravelling more
than the technology itself. When meetings are only occasional, everyone forecasts
that at least a few attractive agents will have failed to match today, and so will
be available to match in the future. This, then, allows for selectivity and so for
16The author has had no success in applying standard assumptions, such as log-concavity. These
kinds of conditions do not seem to bite because, as t→ T , the entire shape of the distribution is
important, so small initial changes in strategy may have large impacts in the future.
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smoothly decreasing reservation values. High types, of course, would prefer to
match with other high types, and the matching friction combined with a limited
duration prevents them from doing so. Indeed, high types have a strict incentive to
start searching earlier. What is less obvious, however, is that low types are either
indifferent or prefer a longer duration.
Lemma 2.5.1. When agents are patient, if the deadline is extended (or, equiva-
lently, the market starts earlier), the extended market time-zero Pareto dominates
the shorter market.
That high types benefit from having more time to search for each other is clear.
That low types do not mind the fact that they wait longer derives from patience.
But if high types spend more time matching with each other, then when a low
type does join the first class he or she samples from a worse distribution. They are
exactly compensated for this by the higher probability of matching given the longer
duration of the market.
To reduce the effect of search frictions, everyone would prefer that the market
started earlier. Indeed, if agents could coordinate, the market would start at time
minus infinity and would deliver perfect sorting. In the presence of search frictions,
early matching serves to improve sorting rather than diminish it.
Moreover, it is exactly the anticipation effect which allows for this result. If
meetings are too uniform and high types match out too quickly, then unravelling
obtains. To this point, Damiano et al. (2005) consider a discrete-time version of
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the model here. In each period, each agent meets a partner randomly drawn from
the set of unmatched agents. They show that, when there are participation costs
and fewer rounds than types, the unique equilibrium involves complete unravelling
– everyone accepts their first partner. This result derives from the uniformity of
meetings. When all of the agents are paired in each period, one equilibrium is that
everyone accepts their first partner, forecasting that the market will be empty next
period. That no other equilibria exist derives from avoidable, costly search.
When search is costly and avoidable, low type agents opt out until they join the
first class. That is, if one does not expect to match in a given period, one should
wait outside of the market. This implies that, at any point in time, only first class
agents participate. If meetings are uniform, if in each round every agent meets a
partner, and all participating agents are mutually acceptable, then all will match
and exit. Perforce, in the model with discrete and uniform meeting rounds, all
of the first class agents at any time match out of the market. But the first class
consists of exactly those types better than the expected type searching tomorrow
less the search cost, and all of these exit today. So the best type left tomorrow
must be worse than the average type tomorrow. No distribution has this property,
everyone must have left today. The only equilibrium is complete unravelling.
If meeting rounds are not uniform and enough first class agents fail to meet a
partner, this result breaks. Sorting can take place. Consider the continuous time
model with random meeting times and patient agents, but suppose that in order to
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receive meetings at any time t, agents must incur a flow cost of c. This yields the
following HJB equation:
U˙(x, t) = −max
{
0,−c+ α(x, t)
∫ x
U(x,t)
(z − U(x, t))Gx(dz, t)
}
.
Proposition 2.5.2. The equilibrium with c > 0 is totally determined by the reser-
vation value of the highest type as in Proposition 2.3.2. Moreover, agents outside
the first class do not participate, preferring to wait until they become acceptable to
the highest type.
Proof. Inspection of the HJB reveals non-increasing reservation values. A similar
argument as above implies that U(x, t) = x for t < τ(x). Hence, agents outside the
first class find it unprofitable to search.
As a point of clarification, the equilibrium does depend on costs. The character-
ization here is the same as in Proposition 2.3.2: all behavior can be summarized in
terms of the reservation value of the highest type. This reservation value, however,
is significantly affected both directly as it now includes costs but also indirectly be-
cause of the different population operating in the market. The important difference
relative to the market without costs is that low types stay out of the market until
they match. Since, when there are costs, all agents in at a given time are first class,
all meetings result in matches. This tends to increase reservation values. On the
other hand, costs have a direct negative effect on reservation values as they mimic
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impatience (as previously described in a steady state framework by Adachi (2003)).
In contrast to Damiano et al. (2005), notice that agents smoothly filter into the
market no matter the magnitude of α (unless α is so small that it is not profitable to
search at all). Hence, it is not a small expected number of meetings which leads to
unravelling. Instead, the harsh strategic interaction induced by simultaneous and
costly rounds of search leads to the stark results obtained in Damiano et al. (2005).
A final distinction is interesting. Far from destroying sorting, small search costs
improve it. Even for vanishing search costs, less attractive types wait outside the
market. This removes the search externality that low types exert on high types
– without costs, the two meet although they are not do not match. With search
costs, every meeting results in a match, thus increasing efficiency of the matching
process. Costly search induces agents to “wait their turn,” greatly improving the
probability of a match for every single type, and also the sorting of types. When
search costs are small, that the highest types prefer this arrangement is obvious –
they trade a small flow cost for a discrete jump in match efficiency. That low types
are indifferent or better off follows from the same logic as Lemma 2.5.1. The very
lowest types are indifferent, receiving their own pizazz in expectation either way.
That they match with a lower type in expectation (because high types match out
faster) is exactly compensated for by an increased probability of matching. Medium
types – those who are in the first class at time zero without search costs but not
with them – are better off because, although they have to wait to join the first class,
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they receive a higher value when they do. Hence, small flow costs lead to a Pareto
improvement over the no-cost model.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I explored the impact of a particularly harsh form of non-stationarity –
a deadline – on a canonical matching model. I showed existence and characterized
equilibria. Attractive individuals form a first class segment of the market whose
members are all mutually acceptable. As the deadline approaches and the expected
number of future meetings declines, this class expands. The model exhibits an “an-
ticipation effect” for low types as they anticipate that their opportunity set will
jump discretely when they join the first class. This drives less attractive agents
either not to match at all before they join the first class or to become more se-
lective, with increasing reservations before they join the first class. The two cases
obtain when agents are patient or impatient, respectively. When agents are patient,
the equilibrium is unique and a small cost of search both improves efficiency and
sorting. The randomness of meeting opportunities prevents complete unravelling
of the market as in Damiano et al. (2005) but still generates an incentive for early
matching.
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2.7 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3 (Uniqueness). Suppose there are two equilibria (UL(t),
GL(z, t)) and (UH(t), GH(z, t)) with UH(0) ≥ UL(0). The proof proceeds in three
major steps. First, a likelihood ratio across the two equilibria is evaluated. From
this one derives a mean life remaining ordering. This ordering, combined with the
first step, implies a monotone likelihood ratio property which is used to show that
the lower equilibrium is always flatter than the higher. Concluding, we find that
the two equilibria can not both satisfy the terminal condition, so not both in fact
satisfy equilibrium.
A word on notation: throughout, superscripts index the equilibrium from which
the relevant object derives so that τL(x) solves UL(τL(x)) = x. Additionally
subscripts indicate that t = τ(x) as Gix(z) = G
i(z, τ i(x)). Further, denote haz-
ard rates with rix(z) = g
i
x(z)/(1 − Gix(z)) and mean life remaining as mix(z) =(∫ x
z
(1−Gix(y))dy
)
/(1−Gix(z)).
Also note that indeed we must have UH(0) > UL(0), otherwise UH(t) = UL(t)
for all t as the dynamic for U is Lipshitz. Since G0 posesses a density, so does
Gi(z, t) and we may write
g˙i(z, t) =

αgi(z, t)(1−Gi(U i(t), t))2 if z < U i(t)
−αgi(z, t)Gi(U i(t), t)(1−Gi(U i(t), t)) if U i(t) ≤ z.
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Integrating this yields
gi(z, t) = g0(z) exp
α
 min{τ
i(z),t}∫
0
[1−Gi(U i(s), s)]ds
−
∫ t
0
Gi(U i(s), s)[1−Gi(U i(s), s)]ds
]}
.
Hence,
gLx (z)
gHx (z)
=
exp
α

min{τL(z),τL(x)}∫
0
[1−GL(UL(s), s)]ds
−
τL(x)∫
0
GL(UL(s), s)[1−GL(UL(s), s)]ds


exp
α

min{τH(z),τH(x)}∫
0
[1−GH(UH(s), s)]ds
−
τH(x)∫
0
GH(UH(s), s)[1−GH(UH(s), s)]ds


.
This expression is continuous everywhere and differentiable except at UL(0), UH(0),
and x. Noting that dτ i(z)/dz = 1/U˙ i(τ i(z)) by the inverse function theorem, some
algebra gives
d
dz
[
gLx (z)
gHx (z)
]
=

0 if z < x,
α
(
1−GLz (z)
U˙Lz
− 1−GHz (z)
U˙Hz
)(
gLx (z)
gHx (z)
)
if x < z < UL(0),
−α
(
1−GHz (z)
U˙Hz
)(
gLx (z)
gHx (z)
)
if UL(0) < z < UH(0),
0 if z < UH(0).
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Further recalling that U˙ ix = −α
∫ x
x
(1−Gi(z, t))dz, we see that this can be written
as
d
dz
[
gLx (z)
gHx (z)
]
=

0 if z < x,(
1
mHz (z)
− 1
mLz (z)
)(
gLx (z)
gHx (z)
)
if x < z < UL(0),(
1
mHz (z)
)(
gLx (z)
gHx (z)
)
if UL(0) < z < UH(0),
0 if UH(0) < z.
Hence, we have a monotone likelihood ratio at τ(x) if mLz (z) ≥ mHz (z) for z ∈
(x, UL(0)). Monotone likelihood ratios implies monotone hazard rates. And, in
particular, if we set x = UL(0), then
d
dz
[
gLx (z)
gHx (z)
]
=

0 if z < UL(0),(
1
mHz (z)
)(
gLx (z)
gHx (z)
)
if UL(0) < z < UH(0),
0 if UH(0) < z.
This implies that rHUL(0)(z) = r
L
UL(0)(z) for z > U
H(0) and rHUL(0)(z) > r
L
UL(0)(z) for
z < UH(0). Also, noting that dmi/dz = rimi − 1, it straightforward to derive that
mix(z) =
∫ x
z
exp
{
−
∫ y
z
rix(s)ds
}
dy.
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This, combined with our inequality on ri above, yields
mLUL(0)(U
L(0)) > mHUL(0)(U
L(0)).
On the way to a contradiction, suppose there exists some x < UL(0) such that
mLx (x) = m
H
x (x) and let x˜ denote the largest such crossing point. Because x˜ is the
largest such x, mLx (x) is continuous in x, and m
L
UL(0)(U
L(0)) > mHUL(0)(U
L(0)), we
must have mLx (x) > m
H
x (x) for all x > x˜. Hence, g
L
x (z)/g
H
x (z) is increasing in z,
and strictly so for z ∈ (x, UH(0)) and x ≥ x˜. This implies, for x ∈ (x˜, UL(0)],
that rHx (z) = r
L
x (z) for z ∈ (UH(0), x), and rHx (z) > rLx (z) for z ∈ [x, UH(0)). So,
from our equation for mi above, we must also have mLx˜ (x˜) > m
H
x˜ (x˜), our desired
contradiction. We conclude that mLx (x) > m
H
x (x) for all x ∈ [0, UL(0)], so that the
likelihood ratio gLx (z)/g
H
x (z) is increasing in z for all x ∈ [0, UL(0)]. This, then,
implies that 1 − GLx (z) ≥ 1 − GHx (z) for all x ∈ [0, UL(0)] and z ∈ X, so that∫ x
x
(1 − GLx (z))dz >
∫ x
x
(1 − GHx (z))dz and U˙Lx < U˙Hx . Thus, since T = τ i(0), we
have
T =
∫ 0
UL(0)
d
dz
τL(z)dz =
∫ 0
UL(0)
1
U˙Lz
dz
<
∫ 0
UL(0)
1
U˙Hz
dz =
∫ 0
UL(0)
d
dz
τL(z)dz = T − τH(UL(0)) < T, (2.7.1)
a contradiction. We conclude that the equilibrium is unique.
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Proof of Lemma 2.4.4. Suppose x1 < x2 and fix t. Suppose y ∈ Ω(x1, t) so that
x1 ≥ U(y, t). Then x2 ≥ U(y, t), so y ∈ Ω(x2, t). Hence Ω(x1, t) ⊂ Ω(x2, t). The
rest follows by Remark 2.2.1.
Proof of Corollary 2.4.5. For monotone U , note that if x1 ≤ x2, then x2 could
simply choose A(x2, t) = A(x1, t)∩Ω(x1, t) and receive the same value as x1. Hence,
U(x2, t) ≥ U(x1, t). That Ω is connected follows from x ≥ U(z, t) ⇒ x ≥ U(z′, t)
for all z′ < z.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2 (Existence). Without loss of generality, suppose T = 1.
Further, write mˆ(x, y, t) for the acceptability function: mˆ(x, y, t) = 1 if y ∈ Ω(x, t)
and 0 otherwise. Next, write m(x, y, t) for the matching function: m(x, y, t) =
mˆ(x, y, t)mˆ(y, x, t) which equals one if (x, y) are mutually acceptable at time t and
zero otherwise. In what follows some function arguments, subscripts, etc. are
dropped to save space when it does not cause confusion.
The proof is in several steps and closely follows Smith (2006). Given value
functions U(x, t), a continuous map U → mU is defined (Lemma 2.7.1). Next, we
show that m → Gm exists and is continuous (Lemma 2.7.2). Finally, closing the
circle, define an operator, T , from the HJB equation, substituting in mU and GmU ,
prove the existence of a fixed point for U = TU – which is an equilibrium – using
Schauder’s fixed point theorem.
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First, let B ≥ max{x, αx} be some fixed number and let
Bt = B exp {(r + α)(1− t)} .
Let Vt = {f : X → R|0 ≤ f ≤ x, ‖f‖ ≤ Bt} where the norm is the total variation
norm. I.e., Vt is a subset of the functions of bounded variation on X. Equip Vt with
the weak-* topology.17 Then, by Alaoglu’s theorem, Vt is weak-* compact. And, by
Tychonoff’s theorem, V = ∏t∈[0,1] Vt is compact in the product topology. Since Vt
is convex, V is convex under pointwise operations. V will be the space of candidate
U used in the application of Schauder’s Fixed point theorem.
Define T : V → V by
T (U)(x, t) =
∫ 1
t
(
−rU(x, s) + α
∫
ΩU (x,s)
max{0, z − U(x, s)}GU(dz, s)
)
ds
By Lemma 2.7.4, T is continuous. By Lemma 2.7.3, TV ⊂ V . Hence there exists a
fixed point U∗ = TU∗ by Schauder’s Fixed Point theorem.
Lemma 2.7.1. There exists a continuous map U → mˆU and a continuous map
U → mU both essentially unique.
17 To clarify, Let C be the set of continuous functions on X and BV be the set of functions
of bounded variation on X. Of course, BV is isometrically isomorphic to the set of measures of
bounded variation on X which is the dual of C by the Riesz Representation Theorem. The weak-*
topology on BV is, then, the weakest topology where if f ∈ C and µ ∈ BV then µ → ∫ fdµ is
a continuous function for every f (this is also sometimes called the vague topology). Then, the
weak-* topology on Vt is just the relative topology inherited from BV equipped with the weak-*
topology.
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Proof. Let Un → U in V . Smith (2006), in his Lemma 8(a), proves that, for
fixed t, there exists a continuous map U(·, t) → mˆ(·, ·, t) and that this yields a
continuous map U(·, t)→ m(·, ·, t). Since V is equipped with the product topology
in t, continuity for each t implies joint continuity of U → mˆU and U → mU .
That these maps are only essentially unique follows from the fact that agents are
indifferent over measure zero differences. But, as shown in Smith (2006), there
exists but one mU such that Un → U implies mUn → mU pointwise and it is this
map which is selected.
Lemma 2.7.2 (Fundamental Matching Lemma). There exists a continuous map
m→ Gm and it is unique.
Proof. The Cauchy problem18 is to find a G solving
G˙(z, t) = αG(z, t) (Ex[θ(x, t)]
−Ex[θ(x, t)|x ≤ z])− η(t) [G(z, t)−H(z, t)]
≡ F (t, G(·, t))(z) (2.7.2)
and G(z, 0) = G0(z) where θ(x, t) =
∫
m(x, z, t)G(dz, t) is the probability that a
meet will result in a match for x at time t. Existence and uniqueness follow from the
Cauchy-Lipshitz theorem for which we need to check that F is bounded, measurable
in t, and Lipshitz in G.
18This proof relies heavily the theory of ODE in Banach spaces. Statements and proofs of the
relevant theorems can be found, for example, in Driver (2003).
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Notice that since m(x, y, t) is bounded and measurable, then both θ(x, t) and
E(θ, x, t)) are bounded and measurable as well. If we equip G(·, t) with the weak-*
topology (i.e. Le´vy metric), then θ is continuous as a function of G and so F is
continuous in G. Given that we are using the weak-* topology for G, it suffices to
show that F (t, G) has uniformly bounded variation. So, fix G and let z1, z2 ∈ X.
Then |F (t, G)(z1)− F (t, G)(z2)| =
|αG(z1, t) (Ex[θ(x, t)]− Ex[θ(x, t)|x ≤ z1])− η(t) [G(z1, t)−H(z1, t)]
− (αG(z2, t) (Ex[θ(x, t)]− Ex[θ(x, t)|x ≤ z2])− η(t) [G(z2, t)−H(z2, t)])|
= |α(G(z1, t)−G(z2, t))Ex[θ(x, t)]
− α(G(z1, t)Ex[θ(x, t)|x ≤ z1]−G(z2, t)Ex[θ(x, t)|x ≤ z2])
− η(t)(G(z1, t)−G(z2, t)− (H(z1, t)−H(z2, t)))|
≤ |2α + η(t)||G(z1, t)−G(z2, t)|+ |η(t)||H(z1, t)−H(z2, t)|.
where the last inequality follows because |G|, |θ| ≤ 1, and
|G(z1, t)E(θ|x ≤ z1)−G(z2, t)E(θ|x ≤ z2)|
=
∣∣∣∣∫
z1≥x≥z2
(∫
m(x, y, t)G(dy, t)
)
G(dx, t)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∫ z1
z2
G(dx, t)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ |G(z1, t)−G(z2, t)|.
Since G and H are probability distributions, their total variation is one. So, if
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η¯(t) = supt η(t) ≤ ζ¯N0 exp(α), then ‖F‖ ≤ 2(α + η¯). Thus, there exists a solution.
For uniqueness, consider the following: Fix two distributions, G1 and G2. Given
the calculation on θ above, we have
‖G1(·, t)E(θG1(x)|x ≤ ·)−G2(·, t)E(θG2(x)|x ≤ ·)‖ ≤ ‖G1 −G2‖
and note that θ is Lipshitz in G: ‖θg1(x) − θg2(x)‖ = ‖
∫
m(x, y, t)(G1(dy, t) −
G2(dy, t))‖ ≤ ‖G1−G2‖, hence any definite integral of θ is Lipshitz in G, and so is
any other Lipshitz function of θ. Hence,
NG(t) =
∫ t
0
exp
(
α
∫ t
s
EG θG(x, τ)dτ
)
ζ(s)ds
is Lipshitz in G and, finally, ηG(t) = ζ(t)/NG(t) is Lipshitz in G because NG(t) ≥
N0 exp(−αT ) (I.e. there are always more people in the economy than if all matches
were accepted over all time). Thus, since F is a composition of Lipshitz functions,
it is Lipshitz. Hence, the solution is unique and continuous in m.
Lemma 2.7.3 (Uniform Boundedness). If U ∈ V, then TU ∈ V.
Proof. We need 0 ≤ TU(x, t) ≤ x and TU(·, t) to have total variation less than Bt.
Simple boundedness is obvious, so focus on bounding the total variation. Let U ∈ V ,
t ∈ [0, 1], and x1 < x2 ∈ X be arbitrary but fixed. We will bound |TU(x1)−TU(x2)|
and then sum over all partitions to obtain a bound for the total variation of TU .
Write ∆x1,x2 = Ω(x1) \ Ω(x1) (recall x1 < x2 =⇒ Ω(x1) ⊆ Ω(x2)).
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Break up the second integral in TU into two pieces Q1(x1, x2) and Q2(x1, x2) as
follows.
∫
Ω(x2)
max{0, z − U(x2)}G(dz)−
∫
Ω(x1)
max {0, z − U(x1)}G(dz)
=
∫
Ω(x1)
max{0, z − U(x2)} −max{0, z − U(x1)}G(dz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Q1(x1,x2)
+
∫
∆
max {0, z − U(x2)}G(dz)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Q2(x1,x2)
Now, because |max(a1, b1)−max(a2, b2)| ≤ |a1 − a2|+ |b1 − b2|, we have
|Q1(x1, x2)| ≤
∫
Ω(x1)
|0− 0|+ |U(x1)− U(x2)|G(dz) ≤ |U(x1)− U(x2)|
≤ Bt|x1 − x2|.
And,
|Q2(x1, x2)| ≤
∫
∆
|max {0, z − U(x2)} |G(dz) ≤ x
∫
∆
G(dz).
Continuing,
|TU(x2)− TU(x1)|
=
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
t
(
r(U(x2)− U(x1))− α
(∫
Ω(x2)
max{0, z − U(x2)}dG
−
∫
Ω(x1)
max {0, z − U(x1)} dG
))
ds
∣∣∣∣
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≤
∫ 1
t
r|U(x2)− U(x1)|+ α (|Q1(x1, x2)|+ |Q2(x1, x2)|) ds
≤
∫ 1
t
(
rBs|x1 − x2|+ αBs|x1 − x2|+ αx
∫
∆
G(dz)
)
ds
Substituting in for Bt, one obtains
∫ 1
t
(
(r + α)Be(r+α)(1−s)|x1 − x2|+ αx
∫
∆
G(dz)
)
ds
= −B|x1 − x2|
(
1− e(r+α)(1−t))+ αx(1− t)∫
∆
G(dz).
Hence, summing over all possible partitions of X,
‖TU‖ = sup
{xi∈X}
∑
xi
|TU(xi)−TU(xi−1)| ≤ B|x−x|
(
e(r+α)(1−t) − 1)+αx(1−t) ≤ Bt.
Lemma 2.7.4 (Continuity). T is continuous.
Proof. Fix U,Un ∈ V with Un → U . Recall that V has the product topology in the
t dimension and the weak-* topology in the x dimension. Hence, Un(x, t)→ U(x, t)
pointwise in t and a.e. pointwise in x. And, because 0 ≤ Un, U ≤ x, the dominated
convergence theorem gives convergence in L1 in both x and t. To show continuity,
we need TUn → TU weak-* for each t. A sufficient condition for convergence is
that, for each t,
∫
I
|TUn(x, t) − TU(x, t)|dx for every measurable I ⊂ X. But,
since 0 ≤ TU ≤ x, we need only show a.e. pointwise convergence (again by the
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dominated convergence theorem). We will divide |TUn − TU | into several pieces
and apply the triangle inequality. While there are many expressions, the division
looks at the two terms of T and decomposes the change in each into (1) a part from
the change in Ω, (2) a part from the direct change in U , and (3) a part from the
change in G. Define the following:
Q1(x, s, n) =
α ∫
ΩU (x,s)
GU(dz, s) + r
U(x, s)
−
α ∫
ΩUn (x,s)
GU(dz, s) + r
U(x, s),
Q2(x, s, n) =
α ∫
ΩUn (x,s)
GU(dz, s) + r
U(x, s)
−
α ∫
ΩUn (x,s)
GU(dz, s) + r
Un(x, s),
Q3(x, s, n) =
α ∫
ΩUn (x,s)
GU(dz, s) + r
Un(x, s)
−
α ∫
ΩUn (x,s)
GUn(dz, s) + r
Un(x, s),
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W1(x, s, n) =
∫
ΩU (x,s)
max{z, U(x, s)}GU(dz, s)
−
∫
ΩUn (x,s)
max{z, U(x, s)}GU(dz, s),
W2(x, s, n) =
∫
ΩUn (x,s)
max{z, U(x, s)}GU(dz, s)
−
∫
ΩUn (x,s)
max{z, Un(x, s)}GU(dz, s),
W3(x, s, n) =
∫
ΩUn (x,s)
max{z, Un(x, s)}GU(dz, s)
−
∫
ΩUn (x,s)
max{z, Un(x, s)}GUn(dz, s).
Note, then, that
TU(x, t)− TUn(x, t) =
∫ 1
t
(∑
i
Qi(x, s, n)− α
∑
i
Wi(x, s, n)
)
ds.
Consider each term in turn. Because mˆUn → mˆU pointwise almost everywhere,
|Q1(x, s, n)| = αU(x, s)
∣∣∣∣∫ mˆU(x, z, s)− mˆUn(x, z, s)G(dz, s)∣∣∣∣→ 0
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for a.e. (x, s). Because Un(x, s)→ U(x, s) pointwise a.e.,
|Q2(x, s, n)| = |U(x, s)− Un(x, s)|
∣∣∣∣α ∫
ΩU (x,s)
GU(dz, s) + r
∣∣∣∣→ 0
for a.e. (x, s). Next, because GUn(z, s)→ GU(z, s) weak-* for a.e. s, we have
|Q3(x, s, n)| = αUn(x, s)
∫
ΩUn (x,s)
|GUn(dz, s)−GU(dz, s)| → 0 for a.e. (x, s).
The same arguments apply for |Wi|, i = 1, 2, 3. Hence,
∫ 1
t
∑
i
|Qi(x, s, n)|+ α
∑
i
|Wi(x, s, n)|ds→ 0
for a.e. x again by dominated convergence, so that |TU(x, t) − TUn(x, t)| → 0 for
a.e. x. This, then, gives
∫
I
|TU(x, t)− TUn(x, t)|dx→ 0 for every t.
Lemma 2.7.5. For fixed G and r = 0 the dynamic for U is Lipshitz continuous.
Proof. When r = 0, we need only consider the dynamic for x which we will write
as U˙ = L(U) = −α ∫ x
U
(1−G(z))dz. Then, fixing U1 and U2, we have
‖LU1 − LU2‖ = α
∥∥∥∥∫ U2
U1
(1−G(z))dz
∥∥∥∥ ≤ α‖U1 − U2‖.
So the dynamic has a Lipshitz constant of α.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4.1. Because U(x, τ(x)) = x, agent’s utility is bounded be-
low by xe−r(τ(x)−t) (i.e. agents can do no worse at any time than deciding not to
match, instead waiting to join the first class). Hence, for all t where an agent is not
in the first class, his utility is bounded below by x exp {−r(T − t)}. Letting r → 0,
U(x, t) ≥ x for all t when x is not in the first class. I.e. as r → 0, we obtain an
equilibrium where low agents wait to join the first class.
Proof of Lemma 2.4.14. Since, for t < τ(x), we can write
U(x, t) = xe−r(τ(x)−t) + α
∫ τ(x)
t
e−r(s−t)
∫ y(x,t)
U(x,t)
(G(y(x, t))−G(z))dzds
we have
U(x, t) ≥ xe−r(τ(x)−t)
≥ xe−r(τˆ(x)−t)
= x
[
1− x
x
(
1 +
r
α
)]− rr+α
e−r(T−t) ≡ Uˆ(x, t)
where the last line comes from substituting in for τˆ(x) as defined in Lemma 2.4.12.
Since U(y(x, t), t) = x, we have
y(x, t) ≤ x
[
1− y(x, t)
x
(
1 +
r
α
)] rr+α
er(T−t) ≤ x
[
1− x
x
(
1 +
r
α
)] rr+α
er(T−t)
≡ yˆ(x, t).
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Write P (x, t) = G(y(x, t))−G(U(x, t)) and V (x, t) = E(z|y ≥ z > U) so that
U˙(x, t) = (r + αP (x, t))U(x, t)− αP (x, t)V (x, t).
Now, V (x, t) < y(x, t) so that
U˙(x, t) ≥ (r + αP (x, t))Uˆ(x, t)− αP (x, t)yˆ(x, t)
≥ (r + αP (x, t))x
[
1− x
x
(
1 +
r
α
)]− rr+α
e−r(T−t)
− αP (x, t)x
[
1− x
x
(
1 +
r
α
)] rr+α
er(T−t)
= x(rλˆ+ αP (x, t)(λˆ− λˆ−1))
if one writes
λˆ ≡
[
1− x
x
(
1 +
r
α
)] rr+α
e−r(T−t).
Then, since t < τ(x), λˆ ≤ 1, and so U˙(x, t) ≥ 0 if
(r/α)λˆ2
1− λˆ2
≥ P (x, t).
And, since P (x, t) < 1, the result obtains.
Proof of Lemma 2.5.1. Suppose T ′ > T are two deadlines, and that U¯ ′ and U¯ are
the equilibrium reservation values of the highest type under each deadline. The
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same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2.3.3 shows that U¯ ′(0) > U¯(0) (whichever
reservation value starts lower must hit 0 earlier, and so it must be U¯).
Those in the first class under the extended duration get U¯ ′(0) instead of U¯(0),
an improvement. Moreover, all x < U¯(0) are indifferent between the two equilibria,
because they get their own pizazz in expectation under both. Those who were first
class in the short duration market but are not in the long duration instead get their
own pizazz. This is an improvement, as they were getting only U¯(0) with the short
duration – the definition of being in the first class at time zero.
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Chapter 3
Directed Search for Wage-Tenure
Contracts with Adverse Selection
This study considers a dynamic labor market where workers are privately informed
about their attachment to the labor force and firms competitively post contracts
to direct workers’ search. This extends the static results on adverse selection in
competitive search markets of Guerrieri et al. (2010) to a dynamic environment
with on the job search a` la Shi (2009). Characterizing the dynamic contracting
problem of firms and the search problem of workers, I show that equilibria feature
full separation, increasing wage profiles, and “job lock” for committed (long dura-
tion) workers, reducing their frequency of transitions relative to a full information
benchmark.
Workers differ in their commitment to the labor market. This can stem from a
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variety of sources such as fluctuations in household income, the demands of home
life, or changing career interests. One prominent example is the difference between
those who plan to stay in the labor force after having a child and those who plan to
exit. One modeling approach, when group differences exist but individual preference
is unobserved, leans on statistical discrimination to explain differences in labor
market outcomes. If firms pay only flat wages or lack commitment power, this
is, perhaps, the only approach. But if firms can promise long term contracts,
heterogeneity in expected tenure induces heterogeneity over tenure-wage profiles.
Separation may obtain, negating the need for statistical discrimination. Moreover,
if this separation is sufficiently costly in terms of efficiency, the same empirical group
differences in wages which motivate models of statistical discrimination in the labor
market may obtain.
If firms indeed were to pursue this strategy, what sort of effects can a search
equilibrium produce with regards to relative wage levels, their trajectories, job-to-
job transitions, and the career ladder? What are the effects of anti-discrimination
policies? I provide a first attempt to address these questions in the context of
a modern model of the labor market featuring competitive, directed search for
wage-tenure contracts under adverse selection. An interesting result is that anti-
discrimination rules have no impact on women, but instead serve only to distort
the market for men. Another is that career-oriented women suffer from a form of
job-lock. The efficiency cost of offering contracts which separate long and short
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duration agents is amortized over the life of the employment contract. A job-to-job
transition, then, involves incurring the this cost again, which reduces the frequency
of turnovers.
Beyond the current application, the methods developed below are more gener-
ally applicable to competitive search for dynamic contracts with adverse selection.
First, equilibria can be found as the solution to a recursive social planner’s prob-
lem as in Guerrieri et al. (2010). Second, it maintains block-recursivity as in Shi
(2009). And, third, while differences in labor market histories induce continuous
heterogeneity, and hence a continuum of incentive compatibility conditions, I show
that, in equilibrium, only one binds for each firm. When formulating contracts,
firms need only need only consider the incentives of workers who face job queues of
equal length.
The next section outlines related literature, followed by a description of the
framework, a benchmark full information equilibrium, the equilibrium with adverse
selection, and some concluding remarks.
3.1 Some Related Models
As oceans of ink have been spilled on the subject of gender differences in the labor
market, I restrict myself here to discussing some direct antecedents of the present
model so as to highlight the implications of the various modeling choices.
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Salop and Salop (1976) develops a prototypical version of the model I consider.
Turnover is assumed costly because of up-front training costs on the part of the firm.
If prospective employees know their probability of quitting, the firm would want to
elicit this information because low-quitters are more valuable. The authors show
that if workers are risk neutral and have access to capital markets, an employment
fee is optimal, and that the efficient allocation can be recovered in a competitive
equilibrium.
Stevens (2004) models homogeneous and risk neutral agents in a labor market
with random search where firms write tenure-based contracts to limit turnover,
workers are ex-ante identical who search on the job. The equilibrium wage profile
is a step contract paying the minimum wage for a period and then jumping up to
marginal product. The result can be thought of as an extension of Salop and Salop
(1976) where worker cash flows are restricted to be non-negative – a lump sum
payment up front is infeasible.
Burdett and Coles (2003) considers the framework of Stevens (2004) but with
risk averse agents. Risk aversion induces firms to provide smooth contracts, but,
so as to reduce turnover, firms pay wages that increase steadily over time. This
result highlights the moral-hazard quality of job-to-job moving. A similar flavor is
provided by Lazear (1981), albeit a rather different environment, which shows that
firms should offer increasing wage profiles to encourage high effort over a career.
Burdett and Coles (2003) has two unfortunate properties both stemming from the
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assumption of random search. First, individual decisions depend upon the entire
distribution of offers which makes the equilibrium somewhat difficult to analyze.
More damming, as all jobs are posted in the same market, the distribution of job-
to-job transitions includes one-step jumps from near the very bottom to near the
very top of the market. This is perfectly acceptable if one understands the model
as a single, narrowly defined, corner of the labor market, but it seems unreasonable
that there exist positive probability of stepping out of McDonald’s and into the
board room.1
The basic framework for my model was developed in Shi (2009) – henceforth
Shi – who adapts the theory of Burdett and Coles (2003) to an environment with
directed search. This results in bounded job-to-job transitions, and simplifies indi-
vidual decisions.
The next most important ingredient for my analysis comes from Guerrieri et al.
(2010) – henceforth GSW – who develop a theory of competitive search in the pres-
ence of adverse selection. As first illustrated by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
competitive equilibria in the presence of adverse selection may suffer from non-
existence. I adopt the notion developed by GSW who extend the notion of com-
petitive search equilibrium, first developed by Moen (1997), to the case of adverse
selection in a static model. They show that equilibria can be computed as the solu-
tion of a sequence of principal-agent problems. This program produces the directed
1Although the model I follow, Shi (2009) has something of the opposite problem: all job
transitions are a deterministic function of a worker’s current wage.
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search analogue of a least cost separating contract. Moreover, it maintains the usual
property of least-cost separating contracts, that the lowest type receives the same
allocation as he would have had there been no information friction. The analogue
with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) is especially strong in the current environment,
as exogenous exit in this market mimics the probability of a loss. Unfortunately, the
static notion of GSW does not generalize in a straightforward manner to dynamic
problems. The key insight developed below is that the sequence of problems derived
by GSW do not require a fully static environment, but only static preferences over
contracts on both sides of the market. And while, in the current model, preferences
over contracts depend upon individual dynamics, that dependence can be sum-
marized by the agent’s current value. Hence, the program of GSW can be used to
generate optimal individual decisions contingent upon a continuation, which is then
embedded into a fixed point problem, producing a solution to the dynamic model.
Given a current value, the worker’s search decision is static. The firm’s dynamic
problem can be decomposed into a promise keeping part and a promise making part,
where the solution of the former produces static preferences over the latter. This
last observation was first made in the context of wage-tenure contracts by Stevens
(2004), but the optimal control argument necessary in the current environment was
developed by Burdett and Coles (2003) in an environment with random search.
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3.2 Framework
This is a model of the labor market with directed search on the job and wage-
tenure contracts. The primitives follow Shi with one exception. Workers differ in
their labor market attachment, which I model as differences in exogenous quit rates.
I reproduce the details of the model for convenience and to fix notation. A longer
discussion can be found in Shi.
3.2.1 Model Primitives
A mass of workers derive flow utility from wealth according to u(w) which is assumed
C2[0,∞], increasing, and concave with limw→0 u′(w) = ∞. Workers may neither
borrow nor save.2 Employed workers produce flow output y for their employer and
consume their wages; unemployed workers receive b < y from home production or
some other source outside the model. Workers, whether employed or unemployed,
continuously search for better employment, as described below. Workers can not
commit to contracts. More specifically, a worker will always quit to any better job
and may at any time quit to unemployment.
There are two types of workers, men and women. Denote these M and W ; i will
index types, i ∈ {M,W}, throughout. The two types differ only in their Poisson
intensity of exogenously exiting the labor market: δW > δM . Exogenous exit leaves
a worker with continuation value normalized to 0 and exiting workers are replaced
2Although equilibrium will imply that saving would be sub-optimal, the no borrowing constraint
is significant.
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by inflows of equal mass to maintain constant population. Exogenous exit should
not be interpreted simply as death. It acts as a stand in for the arrival of any life
event that would cause a worker to abandon the market. The payoffs from such
events need not be modeled provided that they are sufficiently large that no one
would ever continue working after the arrival of a δ event. Of course, there are many
intermediate life events which would only cause some workers to exit. If a worker’s
parent becomes ill and requires elder care, high wage earners may choose to hire help
and continue to work while low wage earners might exit. This dependence would
complicate the model and since the main thrust is to explore the role of adverse
selection in a dynamic context, I maintain the simpler assumption that differences
are over exogenous exits. I discuss the possibility of enriching the environment at
greater length, along with other extensions, below.
On the other side of the market, a large mass of infinitely lived, risk neutral,
and identical prospective firms compete for workers. To obtain a worker, a firm
must advertise a job, incurring a flow cost of k. Advertisements consist of a wage-
tenure contract, a function w(t) indicating the wage to be paid at every tenure
t ∈ [0,∞) so long as the worker stays at the firm and, if discrimination is allowed,
the required gender of an applicant. Write x for a contract and wx(t) for the wage
paid by that contract at tenure t. A filled job with contract x provides flow value
y − wx(t) to the firm. Both workers and firms discount the future at a common
rate ρ > 0. Crucially, assume that firms possess perfect commitment power; that
62
workers outside offers are assumed unobservable, so can not be contracted on; and
that there can be no renegotiation. Whether firms can or would discriminate is
also of central concern. I will consider both the case where firms can perfectly
discriminate – by detailing the required gender of a worker in advertisements – and
the case where such discrimination is disallowed either because the information is
unavailable (blind offers) or because it is non-contractible (no-discrimination laws).
Matching between workers and advertised jobs operates in a continuum of sub-
markets. Each market is characterized by the wage contract advertised in that
market, its tightness, and the characteristics of its applicants. Write θx for the
tightness in the market offering contract x. This is the density of searching workers
divided by the density of advertised jobs. Given a tightness, an individual worker
meets a firm with Poisson intensity p˜(θ) while firms receive meetings with Poisson
intensity q˜(θ) = θp˜(θ). It will be convenient to eliminate θ and write simply q(p) or
p(q). While we refer the reader to Shi for a detailed enumeration of assumptions on
various model primitives, it suffices for now to require p(q) be strictly decreasing and
concave, and that q is bounded above by q¯ = q(0). The grand market, the collection
of all the sub-markets, is characterized by the set of contracts, X , the job-finding
rate p(x) for each contract, and the relative proportion of M and W searching in
each market, γix. At any point in time, a worker receives offers exclusively in the
market in which they search. Each worker may only search in a single market at
any time. And firms may only advertise a job with contract x in the appropriate
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market. As I only consider equilibrium in steady state, no market or aggregate
variables depend on time.
3.2.2 Worker’s Problem
Given these preliminaries, workers choose where to direct their search, whether to
accept a contract offered to them in a meeting with a firm, and whether to quit
into unemployment if employed. Note that, no matter their employment status, a
worker’s current decisions depend only on their current value in that state. Write
V iu for the value of unemployment, and V
i
x(t) for the value of employment at tenure
t under contract x for i = M,W . Workers consider the set of available markets
in which to search and choose optimally given their current state. Given a set of
contracts X and associated job finding rate p(x), a worker with current value V i
searches to maximize the excess value of a new offer:
Si(V
i) = max
x∈X
p(x)(V ix(0)− V i).
For now, suppose that a solution exists and write x = Fi(V
i) for the maximizing
choice. Searching for x generates meetings at a rate p(x). Given a worker searching
for x meets with a firm advertising x, the worker will accept the offer – otherwise
they would have searched for a different contract. Further, suppose that if a worker
searches in a market, firms in that market accept (which will be the case in equi-
librium). Workers would never search in a market where they expect to be rejected
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by all firms. And since firms are identical, the statement that all firms accept is
simply the statement that firms do not randomize in their acceptance decisions.3
Because it will be used extensively below, write ri = δi+ρ. Given optimal search
decisions, the value of employment under x at t is given by
riV
i
x(t) = u(w(t)) + S(V
i
x(t)) + V˙
i
x(t).
The (mortality adjusted) asset-value of employment, riV
i
x , must equal the div-
idend u(w(t)) plus the flow value of changing jobs plus the change in the value.
Since w(t) need not be constant, there will indeed be non-zero change in a worker’s
value. But when unemployed, workers receive a constant benefit, so that the value
of unemployment is constant. Specifically,
riV
i
u = u(b) + S(V ).
Turn now to the firm’s primitive problem.
3.2.3 Firm’s Values
Firms who have a type i worker with tenure t under contract x have no decisions
to make going forward as they are comitted to the contract. They may not end or
3This does not preclude discrimination. Rather, it requires that firms include any discrimina-
tory policy in their advertisements. If the matching technology had increasing returns to scale, it
might be optimal to induce workers to search in a market, but then reject their application. I ig-
nore this possibility, and other related considerations, by simply assuming that the advertisement
is binding on firms.
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amend the relationship. They anticipate, however, that their worker will end the
relationship at some point, either exogenously or because of a competing offer. A
worker with current value V ix(t) exits at a constant rate δi and quits to a competing
offer at a rate p(F (V ix(t))). The value of the worker to the firm, Jx(t), must solve
ρJ ix(t) = y − w(t) + J˙ ix(t)− (δi + p(F (V ix(t))))J ix(t).
This equation simply states that the asset value of an employee is equal to the flow
product, y, less wages, w(t), plus the change in the asset value less the probability
of loosing the worker times the magnitude of the loss. Write Ri(V ) = ρ + δi +
p(Fi(V )) for the interest-rate adjusted Poisson intensity of separation. Suppressing
the contract, the probability a worker survives to tenure t is given by
ψi(t) = exp
{
−
∫ t
0
Ri(V
i
x(s))ds
}
.
Conditional on survival at tenure t, the probability of surviving to t + τ is sim-
ply ψi(t + τ)/ψi(t). Assuming bounded wages, the firm’s value function can be
integrated as
J ix(t) =
∫ ∞
t
ψi(s)
ψi(t)
[y − w(s)] ds.
The profit to a firm of hiring a worker under contract x is Jx(0). But before a
worker can be hired, the contract must be advertised and a worker found. Offering
a contract x yields an applicant of type i at rate γiq(p(x)) and then payoff of J
i
x(0),
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together yielding a flow of
∑
i γiq(p(x))J
i
x(0) which must be greater than or equal
to the flow cost of advertisement, k. Competition will drive this to equality.
3.3 Equilibrium with Perfect Discrimination
When perfect discrimination is allowed, so that a worker’s type is contractible, there
is perfect separation and the presence of multiple types is somewhat irrelevant. The
equilibrium for each type is the same as if there were only one. To see that the
equilibrium can be made fully separating, note that if both types were to search in a
single market, firms must make equal profits from both. Otherwise, the firm could
announce a slightly more generous contract restricted to the more profitable type,
increasing profits. Given workers provide equal profit, and the matching technology
is assumed homogeneous, simply splitting the market in accordance with relative
populations will provide the same matching rate, but be separating.
Shi solves the model when all workers share a common δ.4 The following sum-
marizes part of his argument. The market with two types is, then, simply two
independent markets alongside each other. Suppose for the moment that firms, in-
stead of full wage contracts, promise a value to workers and then optimally choose
the wage to provide that value; this yields Vx(0) = x. Write p(x) and q(x) for the
matching rates for worker and firm in the market providing value x. Suppose that
p′(x) < 0, p′′(x) < 0 so that S(V ) = maxx p(x)(x − V ) has a unique maximizing
4As I expand on his equilibrium, I maintain his assumptions 1 and 2 which ensure existence
and regularity of equilibrium.
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value F (V ). Let [x, x] be the set of offered utilities and suppose that q¯ = q(x) – the
maximum matching rate for firms is given to the firm promising the highest utility.
Notice that if a firm promises x, he faces no voluntary exits: R(x) = ρ+ δ = r. As
is easy to see, then, the profit maximizing contract offered by the highest firm is a
flat wage, w¯ which yields the firm a value of
J ≡ Jw¯(0) = y − w¯
r
.
Since even the most generous employer must cover their advertising costs, zero
profit implies that q¯ y−w¯
r
= k so that w¯ = y − rk/q¯. A worker employed at w¯ will
then enjoy a value x = u(w¯)/r. And as a worker can always quit to unemployment
and stay forever, a lower bound on possible utilities is x = u(b)/r.
Given these bounds, for each x ∈ [x, x] consider the firm’s problem conditional
on having just matched with a worker at a promised utility for the worker of x.
max
w(·)
∫ ∞
0
φ(s)[y − w(s)]ds s.t. x = Vw(0).
This is an optimal control problem with state variable V with dynamic defined
by the worker’s Bellman equation. Shi shows that limt→∞w(t) = w¯ in equilibrium.
This implies that for every x ∈ [x, x], there is some τx such that Vw(τx) = x. Next, by
the principal of optimality, it must be the case that if w(·) solves the firm’s problem
for some x0, then for all x ∈ [x0, x), there exists some τx such that w˜(t) = w(t+ τx)
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solves the firm’s problem given a promise of x > x0. In other words, there is a
baseline wage profile. And given any promised value, the firm provides this value
by offering the baseline wage at some starting time. This observation significantly
simplifies the structure of equilibrium. One need only solve for a single wage profile,
and then promised utilities are given by starting times along this profile.
As derived by Shi, optimality conditions for the firm yield the following differ-
ential equations which, together with the Bellman equations for the worker, yield
w, J and V .
w˙ =
[u′(w)]2
u′′(w)
J(t)
[
dp(F (V ))
dV
]
, J˙(t) = − V˙
u′(w)
(3.3.1)
with boundary J(∞) = J , V (∞) = V¯ , and w(∞) = w¯. These, along with zero
profit for the firm and optimal search by the agent define the conditions of equilib-
rium for Shi. Off equilibrium beliefs are easy to derive given the structure of firms’
optimal offers. For x ≥ x, firms make negative profit and so these are not offered
or, more specifically, workers accept an infinite tightness for those contracts. Sim-
ilarly, no worker would ever accept any x < Vu so these are not searched for. The
only question concerns contracts in [Vu, F (Vu)) as these contracts are not part of
equilibrium but can not be ruled out for promising negative value. Instead, equilib-
rium specifies (common) beliefs concerning the tightness that would obtain if those
markets were to operate. This is given by the zero profit condition for the firm.
Specifically, the system which produced the wage contract can be run backward
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giving w and hence J for any promised utility in [Vu, F (Vu)). So, if x ∈ [Vu, F (Vu)),
let q(x) = k/Jx. Competition guarantees that if a market were to operate it would
give zero profit. Hence, the ratio of workers to jobs is set such that exactly that
obtains. Existence derives from construction of a fixed point on w for this system.
Note that although I have presented the equilibrium with δi = δ, the case where
δW > δM will produce an equilibrium consisting of two parallel ladders, one for M
and one for W , which satisfy the same conditions with the small adjustment that
advertised contracts specify the type of applicants. As the relationship between
model parameters is complicated, and the equilibrium can not be exhibited con-
structively, comparative statics are challenging. Some points, however, are obvious.
First, with δW > δM , it must be that w¯W < w¯M . Simply, since M are expected to be
attached for longer, they have a higher expected lifetime product and hence a taller
wage ladder. Second, zero profit implies that, for any contract xi, q(xi)Jxi = k, so
the job filling rate exactly pins down firms’ values. But then, since M are more
productive, if q(xM) = q(xW ) then the expected present value wage bill under xM
must be greater than under xW .
As briefly mentioned before, pooling can not be a part of any equilibrium where
discrimination is allowed, because every wage profile produces strictly greater profit
for firms employing M than W . Hence, offering a wage slightly higher and specifying
M would attract every M participant in the pooling contract and produce higher
profit. When discrimination is allowed, off-equilibrium contracts are easy to rule
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out. But when the composition of agents who would search for a deviating contract,
if offered, is endogenous, the problem is more delicate. GSW provide an algorithm
which both detects equilibrium offers and specifies deviation payoffs precisely.
3.4 No Discrimination: The Case of Adverse Se-
lection
Suppose now that firms do not observe an agent’s type before entering into the
relationship. Our equilibrium definition almost exactly follows GSW. Let W =
{w : [0,∞) → [0, y]|w˙ > 0} be the set of admissible wage functions and W∗ ⊂ W
for the set of contracts offered in equilibrium with a measure H on W∗ specifying
the proportion of the population searching for each w. For each w ∈ W , write
γM(w) = 1 − γW (w) for the proportion of i types searching in the market offering
w. Let Θ : W → [0,∞] describe the tightness in each market. For any value V ,
the equilibrium specifies a search strategy Fi(V ) which is individually rational for
workers. Given Θ and Fi, firms make non-positive profit at any w and exactly zero
profit in any contract in W∗. Static adding up: ∫W∗ γi(w)/Θ(w)dH(w) = ni where
ni is the number of workers of type i. Dynamic adding up: transitions implied by
worker turnover, exit, and entry, together with optimal search, generate H.
The last condition does not appear in GSW as theirs is a static framework. But,
as is common in directed search equilibria with free entry, the aggregate distribution
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of agents plays no role in individual decisions. Hence, once equilibrium decision
rules have been calculated, the aggregate distributions are generated mechanically.
Shi refers to this property as Block Recursivity. Moreover, the above statement
suppresses the dependence of search decisions on a worker’s current state, but this
comes in through the distribution H: a worker’s current state implies a search
decision which is reflected in H.
Here, I describe the solution method derived by GSW and proceed to apply the
idea to the current environment. To be concrete, suppose the two types are M
and W with static utilities U i(y) over a set of abstract contracts y ∈ Y with firm’s
profits v(y|i). Given a matching function q(p) as above, GSW suggest the following
program. First, solve
S¯W = max
p,y∈Y
{
pUW (y) s.t. q(p)L(y) ≥ k}
and then
S¯M = max
p,y∈Y
{
pUM(y) s.t q(p)L(y) ≥ k, and pUW (y) ≤ S¯W} .
They show, given assumptions detailed in their paper, that this program will pro-
duce contracts and matching rates that satisfy free entry and optimal search. They
go on to use this solution to specify matching rates for off-equilibrium contracts
which make deviations unprofitable, so that the equilibrium is indeed profit maxi-
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mizing.
The problem solves for the optimal static value of search. In the current model,
the value of search to a worker is not static, but a flow: p(x)(x−V ). But the search
decision does not depend upon dynamic considerations beyond the current state, V .
Moreover, in the section above, while a firm’s optimal wage contract depends upon
the dynamic flow of quitters, δi + pi(Fi(V )), there exists a fixed wage contract and
the firm merely choose which segment as a function of the initial promised utility.
Hence, the firm has static preferences over promised utility: Ji(x). So long as the
function Ji(x) can be identified outside of the problem, the GSW program can be
solved for any initial utility V .
The first cornerstone of my construction rests on the observation that one can
select an equilibrium such that the low type, W , remains untouched by the intro-
duction of a higher type. This is done by construction. Given the equilibrium for
W alone, I construct markets for M which do not attract any W . Because there
were no deviations when W were alone, and the new contracts added to the market
are selected exactly to exclude W , there are still no deviations. Hence, the solution
of the first problem in GSW’s program, the problem for W , was solved in the last
section. Let pW (x), FW (x), and w
W
x (·) be the matching function (as a function
of promised value), optimal search decision, and wage profile derived by Shi given
δ = δW , as described above. This yields SW (V ) = pW (FW (V ))(FW (V )− V ).
Now consider the problem of finding the optimal contract and matching rate for
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M . The incentive compatibility constraint represents a significant problem. As W
and M value contracts differently, the firm can not solve for a single wage profile
independently. The difference in preferences between M and W is fundamental for
separation. Contracts intended for M can not simply be indexed by their value,
because the entire wage profile is required to satisfy incentive compatibility on the
part of W . Moreover, there is now a continuum of W at different scales in the
wage ladder, so, in principle, a continuum of conditions might need to be checked.
I resolve the issue in two steps. First, for an arbitrary wage profile, w(·), write
V W (t|w) for the value to W of the contract w at tenure t. For any (p, w) pair,
incentive compatibility requires SW (V ) ≥ p(V W (0|w) − V ) for every V ∈ XW .
Write this as
V W (0|w) ≤ min
V ∈XW
{
V +
SW (V )
p
}
≡ U¯W (p). (3.4.1)
U¯W (p) defines the maximum value any wage contract can deliver to a W and still
satisfy incentive compatibility. The equilibrium value of search for W , SW (V ), is
decreasing and convex (see Shi) hence
Lemma 3.4.1. Given p, the maximum value that can be delivered to W solves
pW (U¯
W (p)) = p. Further,
∂U¯W (p)
∂p
=
1
p′W (U¯W (p))
< 0 and
∂2U¯W (p)
∂p2
= − p
′′
W (U¯
W (p))
[p′W (U¯W (p))]3
< 0
In particular, for p = 0, U¯W (0) = u(w¯W )/rW
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Proof. Observe that
∂
∂V
[
V +
SW (V )
p
]
= 1− pW (F (V ))
p
= 0 =⇒ pW (F (V )) = p.
The derivatives are given by the Inverse Function Theorem.
Although the correct constraint has been identified, it still depends on the entire
wage contract. The intuition was that we could solve for the wage contract first,
and then solve the optimal search problem over promised values. This leads me
to include the incentive compatibility constraint in the firm’s problem directly.
Suppose that, in equilibrium, M can secure values in [xM , xM ] = XM with match
rate pM(x), and corresponding optimal search FM(V ) yielding excess value of search
SM(V ) = pM(FM(V ))(FM(V ) − V ). Consider a firm’s problem when constrained
to offer a value of x to M and no more than U¯W (p) to W .
J∗(x, p) = max
w(·)
∫ ∞
0
ψM(s)[y − w(s)]ds
s.t ψ˙M = − [rM + pM(FM(V ))]ψM (3.4.2)
V˙ M = rMV
M − u(w)− SM(V M) (3.4.3)
V˙ W = rWV
W − u(w)− SW (V W ) (3.4.4)
V M(0) = x, V W (0) ≤ U¯W (p), ψ(0) = 1. (3.4.5)
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To each state ψM , V M , V W associate co-state Λψ, ΛM , ΛW . The Hamiltonian is
H = ψM(y − w)− ΛψψM [rm + pm(Fm(V M))]+∑
i
Λi
[
riV
i − u(w)− Si(V i)
]
(3.4.6)
Write Γi = Λi/ψM and note that Λ˙i = Γ˙iψM−[rM + pM(FM(V ))]ψMΓi. Optimality
implies
−1− u′(w)
[∑
i
Γi
]
≤ 0 and w ≥ 0 (comp. slack) (3.4.7)
Noting that S ′i(V ) = −pi(Fi(V )),
−Λ˙M = −Λψp′M(FM(V ))F ′M(V )ψM + ΛM(rM + pM(FM(V )))
which, after substitution of ΓM , gives
Γ˙M = Λψp′M(FM(V ))F
′
M(V ). (3.4.8)
−Λ˙W = ΛW [rW + pW (FW (V ))]
which we can integrate and obtain
ΓW (t) = ΓW (0)
ψW (t)
ψM(t)
with ΓW (0) ≥ 0, ΓW (0)(V W (0)− U¯W (p)) = 0.
Here, ΓW (0) measures the shadow value of deterring W so that ΓW (0) > 0 if the
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incentive compatibility constraint is binding. Continuing,
−Λ˙ψ = (y − w)− Λψ[rM + pM(FM(V ))]
=⇒ (y − w)ψM = ΛψψM [rM + pM(FM)]− Λ˙ψψM = − d
dt
[
ΛψψM
]
.
Given the transversality condition limt→∞ ψM(t)Λψ(t) = 0, and limt→∞ J(t) = 0,
integrating both sides yields J(t) = Λψ. And since u′(0) = ∞, w > 0 so (3.4.7)
implies ΓM = −1/u′(w)− ΓW and so Γ˙M = −w˙u′′(w)/(u′(w))2 − Γ˙W . Substituting
these into (3.4.8) and recognizing that d(pM(FM(V )))/dV = −S ′′M yields
−JS ′′M = [δW − δM + pW − pM ] ΓW +
u′′(w)
(u′(w))2
w˙. (3.4.9)
Note, this condition differs from (3.3.1) by the term involving ΓW . ΓW is the
shadow value on the incentive compatibility constraint, and the term in the bracket
is the difference in quit rates between W and M . Where it is positive, the wages
for M are steeper than optimal. In particular, by definition of U¯W (p), we have
pW = pM at tenure zero in equilibrium. So whenever incentive compatibility binds,
the wages for M are steeper than optimal, at least at tenure zero.
It can be shown that H = 0 for all t. Given this, substituting (3.4.2) into H and
then J for Λψ yields H = ψM
[∑
i
(
ΓiV˙ i
)
− J˙
]
. Together with (3.4.7), this yields
J˙ = − V˙
M
u′(w)
+ ΓW
[
V˙ W − V˙ M
]
. (3.4.10)
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Compare this with (3.3.1). When ΓW = 0, the equation carries the interpretation
that an increase in the worker’s value with tenure exactly matched the decrease in
the firm’s value, where u′ serves to adjust units. When incentive compatibility
binds, there is a wedge between the two.
Equations (3.4.10), (3.4.9), the Bellman equations for workers and firm, along
with the solution for ΓW provide a system of differential equations which, along with
boundary and transversality, determine the system. Let J∗(x, p) be the maximized
value for the firm.
The most valuable payoff to M , xM , is given by J∗(xM , 0) = k/q¯. This value
depends only on model primitives because a worker in the best job does not search.
Notice, this will not be a flat contract because it must satisfy incentive compatibility.
Further, define the lowest value as xM = u(b)/rm, and write XM = [xM , xM ].
Equilibrium requires that each x ∈ XM be assigned a wage profile and a matching
rate pM(x) that satisfy incentive compatibility and are optimal for both workers
and firms.
Having embedded the incentive compatibility constraint into the firm’s problem,
I provide first order conditions governing the optimal choice of p, x for every V ∈ XM
given a matching function pm to be used in the firm’s problem. The GSW program:
PGSW(V |pm, Fm) : SM(V ) = max
p,x
{p(x− V ) s.t. q(p)J∗(x, p) = k} .
Letting µ be the multiplier on the zero profit constraint, the first order conditions
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are
x− V = −µ [q′(p)J∗(x, p) + ΓW (0)q(p)(d U¯W (p)/dp)] ,
p = µq(p)
[
ΓW (0) +
1
u′(w(0))
]
,
q(p)J∗(x, p) = k.
Where I have substituted ∂J∗/∂x = ΓM(0) and ∂J∗/∂UW = ΓW (0).
For each V and given pm and Fm, PGSW(V |pm, Fm) yields promised utility, x =
Fˆ (V ) and job finding rates pˆ(x). The equilibrium will then be a fixed point in this
mapping. Let p¯ solve q(p¯)(y− b)/rM = k; p¯ is upper bound on p: a firm making the
maximum feasible payoff must suffer a compensating amount of competition which
induces high job-finding.
Let
P =
{
p ∈ C[XM ]|0 ≤ p ≤ p¯, p(xM) = 0, p weakly decreasing, weakly concave} ,
F =
{
F ∈ C[XM ]|xM ≤ F ≤ xM , F (x) ≥ x, weakly increasing} .
And define Ω : P×F→ P×F by (pˆ, Fˆ ) = Ω(p, F ) =
{
(pˆ, Fˆ ) solves PGSW(·|p, F )
}
.
Our equilibrium for M will be a fixed point of Ω. As of yet, however, an existence
proof eludes me. In the discrete time analogue of this model, the proof of Menzio
and Shi (2010) applies with little alteration. I am in the process of formulating
a limiting argument to obtain existence in the continuous time model where the
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convenient characterization of the wage contracts is available.
3.5 Discussion and Plans for Future Work
The analysis above remains somewhat incomplete. In this section, I provide some
discussion, conjecture, and plans to improve upon this work.
While the model at hand is possessed of some elegance and simplicity, its solu-
tion is not. Moreover, any econometric or serious calibration study would require
the model be expanded to allow for a great deal more flexibility, only increasing
its intractability. A relatively straightforward extension would allow for n different
separation rates. This kind of equilibrium could be solved iteratively in the same
way that the problem for M was solved conditional on the outcome for W in this
paper. Other extensions – such as heterogeneous productivity or values from unem-
ployment – seem like they would be more complex, but have been accommodated
in similar models such as Burdett et al. (2011).
As already mentioned, I have yet to prove existence of the equilibrium but that
hurdle seems surmountable. Somewhat more frustratingly, I have had surprising
difficulty in deriving results comparing the two wage ladders in the no-discrimination
case. I am specifically interested in the relative levels and slopes of wage profiles by
gender. The original idea for this project was that, since separation probabilities
induce a single crossing over wage-profiles, self-selection should be supported in a
directed search environment. And, hence, one should expect different contracts
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to separate types, and these separating contracts to generate heterogeneous labor
market outcomes. Specifically, one should expect steeper contracts for M . As of
yet, I have only proved this for the best contract offered.
That low turnover workers might want to self-select into steep wage contracts
is far from novel, having been discussed in Salop and Salop (1976), and in a more
general discussion of the kinds and nature of discrimination, by Stiglitz (1973).
But modern equilibrium search models provide for rich equilibrium effects even
with seemingly vanilla primitives. Re-casting old intuition in these new models has
the possibility of bringing more realistic features without resort to more contrived
examples.
While I glossed over this fact in the discussion above, the fixed point prob-
lem will only yield strategies and beliefs within equilibrium. But beliefs need to
be specified for any feasible contract, not just those acted upon in equilibrium.
Constructing these beliefs for the discriminatory economy was much easier because
agents shared preferences and deviations could be restricted to one-dimensional set.
To be well defined, equilibria in directed search environments require beliefs over
the tightness and composition not just of markets operating in equilibrium, but all
possible markets. This prevents incompleteness and coordination issues described
in Delacroix and Shi (2006) (i.e. workers do not search for a desirable contract x
because they believe no firm will offer it, and no firm offers it because every firm
believes that no worker would search for it). As pointed out by GSW, specifying
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out of equilibrium tightness serves to refine the set of equilibria. My equilibrium
construction only provides tightness for contracts offered in equilibrium. I have yet
to solve for a supporting set of off-the-path beliefs. GSW provide an algorithm, but
theirs is a finite context; I have yet to find a suitable generalization.
Finally, as I mentioned above while introducing the nature of gender hetero-
geneity, the analysis could be extended to allow for endogenous quits. Indeed, it
can. If, for example, a worker faces an α arrival of a “life event” that would yield
flow utility z drawn from some distribution G(z), but would require the worker to
quit. Then the exit rate the firm faces changes to R = r + p(F (V )) + α[1−G(V )]
and would affect worker’s value functions in an analogous way. This opens up the
interesting possibility that a group with, ex-ante, a relatively high probability of
exit, might receive steeper wage profiles than others so as to encourage staying.
And then, if the population consisted of individuals differing in the distribution of
outside options they receive, one would have a qualitatively similar adverse selec-
tion problem, but with a richer moral hazard problem attached. This would seem
to be the correct model in which to address the differences between self-selection
and statistical discrimination if some women, for example, were more or less career
oriented, as described by different distributions for the exogenous outside option.
Perhaps the most important direction for further research is an examination
of the vast empirical literature. While certain facts seem clear – the higher quit
rates for women in aggregate – there are subtleties – when sufficient controls are
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included, differential quit rates may disappear. But since my model should deliver
predictions linking labor force attachment and the trajectory of wages and careers,
testing it will require I gather stylized facts regarding those variables.
3.6 Conclusion
While the analysis remains preliminary, the model I develop seems capable of pro-
ducing a variety of predictions regarding various labor market outcomes with rel-
ative parsimony: a single parameter difference, when combined with equilibrium
search, produces rich equilibrium objects. Until I develop more concrete results
with the model, however, the most significant contribution is methodological. I
illustrate an example of how, in some situations, the purely static framework of
GSW can be extended to dynamic economies of adverse selection.
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Chapter 4
Noisy Search for Multiple
Products1
Firms offer a variety of goods and consumers search for low prices on a basket
of different goods. As a consumer visits different stores in a search for multiple
products, at any individual firm, they can chose to purchase all of their desired
goods, or just to purchase one, planning to purchase the rest elsewhere. Hence,
consumers purchasing decisions depend both on the sum of prices in a basket, but
also on the individual prices themselves. The resultant purchasing behavior differs
from simple single product search. The focus of this study is on the implications
of this behavior on equilibrium pricing decisions, and the dispersion of prices both
within and across firms.
Prices are disperse. The law of one price mostly never holds. Prima facia, one
1Kenneth Burdett is a co-author on this project.
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might suppose that this is easily explained by the fact that information is costly
and consumers do not know where the best prices are and so firms may set different
ones. Search is, however, not suffcient to deliver dispersed prices – this is the so-
called Diamond (1971) paradox. If a firm knows a consumers’ reservation value,
they can charge it, leaving consumers with no surplus. If consumers must pay to
search, they know they will simply be charged their reservation price and so do not
search in the first place. Simple, homogeneous, costly sequential search leads firms
to post equal prices, and to no sales.
This negative result can be broken in a variety of ways, but most all require
sacrificing the homogeneity that induced firms to know, and be willing to charge,
consumer’s reservation values. One plausible and tractable model requires no ex-
ante heterogeneity across consumers, but instead supposes that some consumers can
be lucky in their search, and simultaneously receive more than one price offer. This
is the noisy search model of Burdett and Judd (1983). In this model, the monopoly
power of search highlighted by Diamond is tempered by possibility that consumers
may have another offer. So long as some consumers have only one offer while some
others have more than one, firms must act as though they are in an auction with an
unknown number of bidders, and so randomize their prices. Price dispersion is an
equilibrium object, and so rationalizes consumer’s need to search. It is this search
protocol we embrace in this study.
If instead of retail markets, one considers the labor market, that a job has
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many dimensions is largely unimportant. Insofar as consumers must take all of
the characteristics at one job, only the derived utility of the bundle matters –
that one has high pay and another good benefits is inconsequential. Similarly, if
a consumer must purchase, for example, all of the elements for an audio system
from one retailer because of compatibility, only the bundle price matters, and so
single-product models are appropriate. Similarly, if each individual retailer offered
only a single good, so long as preferences are sufficiently separable there will be no
interaction between the different goods. But when firms must post prices for each
good, and consumers decide which they would like to buy, one must consider an
explicitly multi-product model.
4.1 Some Literature
The first paper to consider the multi-product search, Burdett and Judd (1983),
solved the consumer’s decision problem given a distribution of prices, in extreme
two cases – one where consumers have free recall of previous prices, and the other
where there is no recall. While Burdett and Judd (1983) solved only the two-good
case with no recall, Carlson and McAfee (1984) further characterize the N good
case and derive various comparative statics. Consumers
These early studies focused on unit demands – as we will in this paper. In the
single product setting this is something of a normalization. Whether consumers have
unit demands or non-degenerate downward sloping curves, consumer will follow a
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reservation price strategy. Anglin and Baye (1987) and Anglin (1990) shows that,
in general, in the multi-product case, this is no longer true. Gatti (1999) provides
sufficient conditions on the utility function to regain the reservation price property.
Other studies avoid this issue by constraining the consumer’s ability to sequen-
tially search. Shelegia (2012) and Zhou (2014) consider a duopoly case, so that
search histories have at most two entries. Zhou obtains results in a model of hori-
zontal differentiation in a simlar spirit to Weitzman (1979) and characterizes firms’
pricing decisions. He shows that, in this setting, there can be “joint search ef-
fect” which can induce firms to lower their prices in response to higher search costs.
Shelegia (2012) is much closer to the current study, as consumers have unit demands
and consumer engage in noisy search. Indeed the simplest case we describe here
is reproduced almost exactly there. But that study is interested in the impact of
consumers’ joint valuation of goods, i.e. the impact of substitutes and complements
on price distributions. And specifically, reservation values are taken as given. In
the current study, we derive these as the result of strategic sequential search.
4.2 The Model
This is a model of a retail market for goods A and B. Generically, write i for a good
and, when necessary, j for the other good. The market is populated by a unit mass of
firms, and some mass of consumers. A mass q ∈ [0, 1/2] of firms can produce good A
at constant marginal cost c instantaneously on demand. Similarly, a mass q of firms
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can produce only good B at a constant marginal cost c instantaneously on demand.
Call these one-good-firms (1f’s). Finally, a mass 1 − 2q of firms can produce both
A and B, each at constant marginal cost c instantaneously on demand. Call these
two-good-firms (2f’s). Firms must post prices, may not bundle, nor discriminate in
any other way.
Each good is worth z to a consumer who demands it, and consumers demand at
most one unit of each good. A mass n01 of consumers enter the market demanding
one unit of good A. Similarly, a mass n01 of consumers enter the market demanding
one unit of good B. Collectively call these one-good-buyers (1b’s). Finally, a mass
n02 of consumers enter the market demanding a single unit of both goods. Call these
two-good-buyers (2b’s). The search protocol of consumers is a hybrid of standard
costly sequential search without recall from, e.g., Lippman and McCall (1976) and
the noisy search protocol of Burdett and Judd (1983). Specifically, some consumers
initially have free contact with either one or two sellers (the noisy search protocol)
but may reject these initial offers and search sequentially, paying a cost k to contact
a new firm at random with out recall.
The model is essentially static, but consider the following timing for the purposes
of exposition. Each day firms and consumers are born. At the end of the day they
die, collecting payoffs. Consumers search to maximize expected utility given their
belief about the joint distribution of prices – surplus from purchases less total search
costs. Firms set prices to maximize profits over the course of the day – number of
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sales times markup over cost. Each day is divided into a countably infinite number
of rounds, numbered 0, 1, 2, . . .. No party discounts during the day. In round zero,
firms set prices which they can not change during the day. In round one, consumers
begin their search. Some proportion β0 ∈ (0, 1) of the 1b’s are freely in contact
with one firm, each drawing at random from the set of firms. A complementary
proportion of the 1b’s, 1− β0, are freely in contact with two firms and may choose
to buy from either firm – there is no cost to purchasing one good from each firm.
Similarly, a proportion α0 ∈ (0, 1) of 2b’s have free contact with one firm in round
one, and 1 − α0 of 2b’s have free contact with two firms. All consumers who have
satisfied their demand exit at the end of the period, and any consumer may also
choose to exit even if they have not satisfied their demand.2 In round two and all
subsequent rounds, if a consumer has not previously exited, they must pay k, and
then randomly contact a new firm, losing contact with previous firms (there is no
recall), and may buy any good the firm offers at its posted price, and either exit or
continue to the next round. Equilibrium, then, requires the distribution of posted
prices equal beliefs, consumers purchase optimally, and firms profit maximize given
consumers’ purchasing behavior.
2An option which would be exercised if the expected value of continued search is negative.
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4.2.1 The Consumers’ Problems
Consumers solve an optimal stopping problem given their belief about the joint
distribution of prices posted by firms, FA,B(pA, pB) with marginals FA and FB. For
convenience, treat a 1f who does not sell a good i as selling it, but at an infinite
price. As noisy search is assumed only to occur in the first round, a consumer who
is lucky enough to see two sets of prices in the first round faces the same problem
going forward as one who was not so lucky. Noisy search induces competition among
firms, but does not change reservation values relative to sequential search.3 Burdett
and Malueg (1981) provide formal solution of the sequential search problem without
recall in the case of two products. We summarize the result here for convenience.
Consumers follow an optimal stopping rule with three reservation values written
W , RA, and RB, corresponding to the three possible states in which searching
consumers may find themselves – searching for both goods (2b’s), searching only
for A (having already purchased B for the 2b’s or never having demanded B in the
first place), or searching only for B. Ri is the standard reservation value from single
product search for good i (see, e.g. Lippman and McCall (1976)). Consumers pay at
most their expected cost of continued search, or their reservation value, whichever
is lower.
3In their original work, Burdett and Judd (1983) consider the case where consumers sequentially
conduct noisy search, with the possibility of seeing one or two prices in each round of search. In the
multi-product case, this would requires integration over of the joint distribution of the minimum
of two price draws which is less tractable. This is left for future work.
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Ri = min{z, k +
∫ Ri
p
i
pidFi(pi) + (1− Fi(Ri)Ri}. (4.2.1)
If Ri = z, then search is not profitable – consumers drop out after their first (free)
search.
W is the highest amount a consumer would pay for a basket of both goods.
That is, given a menu of prices (pA, pB), the consumer chooses to buy one, both, or
neither goods, paying (in expectation, assuming continued search is profitable)
min{pA +RB, RA + pB, pA + pB,W}
If one writes QA = W − RB, QB = W − RA, then 2b’s will buy according to the
following strategy:
1. Purchase A and B if pA + pB ≤ W and pi ≤ Ri.
2. Purchase A but not B if pA ≤ QA and pB > RB.
3. Purchase B but not A if pB ≤ QB and pA > RA.
4. Otherwise, purchase neither and search again.
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Given this strategy, one derives W analogously to Ri as
W = min
2z, k +
∫
{pA+pB≤W,
pi≤Ri}
(pA + pB)dFA,B(pA, pB)
+
∫
{pA≤QA,
pB>RB}
(pA +RB)dFA,B(pA, pB) +
∫
{pB≤QB ,
pA>RA}
(pB +RA)dFA,B(pA, pB)
+
∫
{pA+pB>W,
pi>Qi}
WdFA,B(pA, pB)
 (4.2.2)
As a practical matter, solving this equation is less straightforward than in the
case of single product search. One can, however, derive most of the same compar-
ative statics. These, along with the search problem for N goods, are explored by
Carlson and McAfee (1984).
4.2.2 Firms’ Problem
In their price setting decision, firms trade off price against sales. Noisy search
induces a downward sloping demand curve – the higher a firms’ price, the greater
the probability that a noisy searcher is quoted a lower price from another firm.
Further, firms must decide whether to target 1b’s, requiring only that pi ≤ Ri, or
2b’s with the additional constraint that pA + pB ≤ W . This last is, however, not
strictly true – as noisy searchers see two firms prices, they can make a basket costing
92
less than W , allowing firms to sell to 2b’s that would not buy without this other
firm.
Firms must form beliefs concerning consumers’ reservation values, and the num-
ber of consumers of each type who visit their store over the course of the day. Write
N for the number of consumer-rounds per firm over the course of the day. That
is, if, say, there were 1 consumer per firm in the first round and all consumers
exit each period with probability r, then the total number of consumer-rounds per
firm would be 1/r. Write n1 = nA = nB for the proportion of these consumer-
rounds with demand for only A and the proportion with demand for only B (which
equal one another). Consumers who originally demanded both goods may buy one
while continuing to search for the other, and so may become one-good-buyers. As
it should not cause confusion, refer to these as 1b’s. Write n2 = 1 − 2n1 for the
proportion who demand both goods. Further, write α ∈ (0, 1) for the proportion of
the N · n2 consumer-rounds of two-good-consumers in contact with only one firm,
and 1−α for the proportion who simultaneously contact two firms. Similarly, write
β ∈ (0, 1) for the proportion of the N · n1 consumer-rounds of one-good-buyers in
contact with only one firm, and 1 − β for the proportion in simultaneous contact
with two firms.4 It will be convenient to have some notation. Write
ns1 ≡ (1− β)n1, ns2 ≡ (1− α)n2, and ns ≡ ns1 + ns2
4Notice, these are not the same as α0 and β0 as these are the proportion of first round searches
with single contact. Whereas α and β are the proportion of all searches with single contact
throughout the day (which is the relevant quantity for firms’ pricing decisions).
93
for the one-good-consumers with simultaneous contact, two-good-consumers with
simultaneous contact, and total proportion, respectively. Similarly, write
nc1 ≡ βn1, nc2 ≡ αn2, and nc ≡ nc1 + nc2
for the proportion of consumes with single contact. As some consumers see two sets
of prices, the total number of visitors a firm expects over the course of the day is
N(nc + 2ns).
Given consumers’ reservation values, W,RA, RB, firms sell to different subsets
of consumers as a function of their price levels. A 1f selling i with price less than
Qi can sell to both the 1b’s demanding i and also to 2b’s, but will only sell to noisy
searchers whose alternate price offer is higher.5 If this 1f prices between Qi and Ri
it will sell to any 1b desiring i, will never sell to 2b’s seeing only one set of prices,
but may sell to a 2b seeing another set of prices. This last occurs if the alternate
firm prices i high, but j low enough to make a basket with its competitor costing
less than W. That is, if a 1f offers pi on good i, and a noisy searcher is in contact
with an alternate firm pricing at (p′i, p
′
j) and pi < p
′
i and pi + pj ≤ W , the 1f will
sell good i to that consumer. Write XA(pA) ≡ FB(W − pA) − FA,B(pA,W − pA)
(similarly define XB(pB)), for the probability of selling in such a situation. These
observations lead to the following profit function for the 1f.
5We’ll ignore the possibility of the tie, as equilibria price distributions will be atomless.
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Remark 4.2.1. A 1f selling good A faces a profit function
pi1(pA) = N [n
c + 2ns(1− FA(pA))](p− c)
if p ≤ Q. If, instead, QA < pA ≤ RA, the profit function is given by
pi1(pA) = N [n
c
1 + 2n
s
1(1− FA(pA))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Noisy 1b
+2ns2XA(pA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Noisy 2b
](p− c).
Finally, profit is zero for pA > RA. A similar result holds for 1f selling good B.
A 2f firm faces a more complicated problem. They sell to all 1b’s so long as
pA ≤ RA and pB ≤ RB, and the 1b does not have a better offer. If pA + pB ≤ W ,
they additionally sell a good to all 2b without a better offer on that good. Finally,
if pA + pB ≥ W , they may sell one good to noisy searcher 2b who have an offer
making a basket, as was the case with 1f’s above. This yields the following:
Remark 4.2.2. Recalling that XA(pA) ≡ FB(W −pA)−FA,B(pA,W −pA), the profit
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function for a 2f is given by pi2(pA, pB) =
∑
i∈{A,B}
N(nc + 2ns(1− Fi(pi))(pi − c) if pA + pB ≤W,pi ≤ Ri
N(nc + 2ns(1− FA(pA))(pA − c) if pA ≤ QA, pB > RB
N(nc + 2ns(1− FB(pB))(pB − c) if pB ≤ QB, pA > RA
∑
i∈{A,B}
N [nc1 + 2n
s
1(1− Fi(pi)) + 2ns2Xi(pi)](pi − c) if Qi < pi ≤ Ri, pA + pB > W
N [nc1 + 2n
s
1(1− FA(pA)) + 2ns2XA(pA)](pA − c) if QA < pA ≤ RA, pB > RB
N [nc1 + 2n
s
1(1− FB(pB)) + 2ns2XB(pB)](pB − c) if QB < pB ≤ RB, pA > RA
0 if pi > Ri.
(4.2.3)
Notice, that in each of the seven cases above, profit is additively separable across
goods. Also note that no firm will ever set a price greater than Ri on a good that
they offer, as this yields no sales.
Given symmetric data, we will focus on symmetric equilibria (across goods) and
define equilibrium as
Definition 4.2.3. A symmetric equilibrium is a list of reservation values (W,R),
profit for both types of firms (p¯i1, p¯i2), a joint distribution of prices FA,B with
marginals FA and FB and pricing strategies of firms (G
1(p), G2(pA, pB)) such that
1. Consumers formulate W and R according to equations (4.2.2) and (4.2.1).
2. Firms maximize: pi1(p) = p¯i1 for all p in the support of G
1 with pi1(p) ≤ p¯i1 else-
where; pi2(pA, pB) = p¯i2 for all (pA, pB) in the support of G
2 with pi2(pA, pB) ≤
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p¯i2 elsewhere.
3. Consistency:6
FA,B(pA, pB) = q(1{pB =∞}G1(pA)+1{pA =∞}G1(pB))+(1−2q)G2(pA, pB).
Next, we formulate equilibrium in the simplest case.
4.3 Simplest Case
In this section we construct an equilibrium reminiscent of the single product equi-
librium of Burdett and Judd (1983). Suppose q = 0 so that all firms offer both
goods, and n01 = 0 so that all consumers initially demand both goods. Recall from
the consumers’ problem that 2b’s only transition to become 1b’s after encountering
a price pair (pi, pj) with pi ≤ Q and pj > R. As no firm prices above R on goods
they offer, and all firms offer both goods when q = 0, we conclude that no 2b’s ever
become 1b’s. In this simplest case, we have n1 = 0. This then implies n
c = αn2
and ns = (1 − α)n2. Because of this, we can derive our first result. No firm offers
a basket costing more than W .
Lemma 4.3.1. When q = 0 and n1 = 0, then all firms’ basket price is acceptable
6Recall, this is an improper distribution if q > 0, as we follow the notational convention that
firms who can not sell a good post an infinite price for that good.
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so that
suppFA,B ⊆ {pA, pB|pi ≤ R, pA + pB ≤ W}.
Proof. As no consumer will ever pay more than R for a good, no firm will ever set
a price higher than R. Let θi be the probability a consumer purchases good i from
a firm posting (pA, pB) (outside the acceptance set) conditional on not receiving a
better offer for good i from another firm.7 That is,
θi =
Xi(pi)
1− Fi(pi) .
Let pˆi be the expected price a consumer expects to pay for good i conditional on
receiving the offer (pA, pB). That is
pˆi = θipi + (1− θi)E[Pi|Pi ≤ pi]
where the expectation is taken over expected acceptable prices. Then we have the
7This proof almost exactly follows the proof in McAfee (1995), except that without recall θi is
defined differently.
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following:
pi(pA, pB) =
∑
i
2ns(1− Fi(pi))θi(pi − c)
≤
∑
i
2ns(1− Fi(pi)) [θi(pi − c) + (1− θi)(E[Pi|Pi ≤ pi]− c)]
=
∑
i
2ns(1− Fi(pi))(pˆi − c)
<
∑
i
[nc + 2ns(1− Fi(pˆi))](pˆi − c)
= pi(pˆA, pˆB).
Hence, deviating to (pˆA, pˆB) is profitable.
4.3.1 Deriving Equilibrium
Recall, if pi ≤ R and pA + pB ≤ W , then
pi(pA, pB) =
∑
i∈{A,B}
N [nc + 2ns(1− Fi(pi))](pi − c). (4.3.1)
Equilibrium requires constant profits: pi(pA, pB) = p¯i on the support of F and
pi(pA, pB) ≤ p¯i elsewhere. As in Burdett and Judd (1983), F must be continuous,
and so at interior optima, first order conditions give
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0 = N [nc + 2ns(1− Fi(pi))]− 2Nnsfi(pi)(pi − c)
= Nn2{[α + 2(1− α)(1− Fi(pi))]− 2(1− α)fi(pi)(pi − c)}
=⇒ d
dp
[Fi(p)(p− c)] = 2− α
2(1− α)
=⇒ Fi(p) = 2 + α
2(1− α)
(
p
p− c
)
+
Cons
p− c .
To determine the constant of integration, substitute Fi(p¯i) = 1 to get
Cons = − α
2(1− α) p¯i − c
so
Fi(p) =
2− α
2(1− α) −
α
2(1− α)
p¯i − c
p− c .
Solving for Fi(pi) = 0 yields
p
i
=
αp¯i + 2(1− α)c
2− α .
Hence, given the upper bound of the support p¯i, the marginal distributions of
each price are determined. To obtain this upper bound, one simply notices that
the highest price charge, p¯i must simply be the reservation value of the consumer:
R = p¯i. By Lemma 4.3.1, we must have p¯i ≤ R. For the reverse inequality, suppose
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not, that p¯i < R. But then, a firm charging pi = R loses no customers (because it is
already pricing at the top of the distribution) and strictly increases profits. Closing
equilibrium then just requires solving for R in the consumer’s problem given this
distribution. The result is in three cases concerning the relation between costs,
values, and competition.
Proposition 4.3.2. If
z > c+
k
1 + α
2(1−α) log
(
2−α
α
) ,
then the marginal distribution of prices in any interior equilibrium are given by
Fi(pi) =
2− α
2(1− α) −
1
2(1−α)
α
+ log
(
2−α
α
) k
pi − c.
Reservation values are given by
R = c+
k
1 + α
2(1−α) log
(
2−α
α
) , Q = c− k α2(1−α) log (2−αα )
1 + α
2(1−α) log
(
2−α
α
) ,
W = 2c+ k
1− α
2(1−α) log
(
2−α
α
)
1 + α
2(1−α) log
(
2−α
α
) .
If, instead
c < z < c+
k
1 + α
2(1−α) log
(
2−α
α
)
then
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Fi(p) =
2− α
2(1− α) −
α
2(1− α)
z − c
p− c
and
R = k+c+
α
2(1− α) log
(
2− α
α
)
(z−c), Q = c+ α
2(1− α) log
(
2− α
α
)
(z−c),
W = k + 2
(
c+
α
2(1− α) log
(
2− α
α
)
(z − c)
)
.
Finally, if c ≤ z there is no market.
Proof. Suppose we are in the first case. Given the above, we need to find a reser-
vation value R where R = k + E[pi], or
R = k +
∫ p¯i
p
i
pdFi(p).
Substituting in, we get
R = k +
R∫
αR+2(1−α)c
2−α
p
(
α
2(1− α)
)(
R− c
(p− c)2
)
dp
= k + c+
α
2(1− α) log
(
2− α
α
)
(R− c)
=⇒ R = c+ k
1 + α
2(1−α) log
(
2−α
α
)
Substituting into F gives the result above. For W and Q, recall that when all firms
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price in the acceptance set, W = k + E[PA] + E[PB], and Q = W −R = E[Pi].
In the second case, the consumer’s value limits prices, and is thus the upper
bound of the distribution, but all else proceeds the same. And in the final case,
there are no gains from trade.
These statements were made conditional on all firms pricing at an interior op-
timum. That is, firms are not constrained by the acceptance set in equilibrium.
If consumers can freely recall previous offers, McAfee (1995) shows that bound-
ary equilibria, where firms are constrained by the acceptance set and price on the
boundary, may obtain. Without recall, this is not possible.
Lemma 4.3.3. All equilibria are interior, of the form in Proposition 4.3.2. Firms
are not constrained by the boundary.
Proof. Suppose there were an interval [p0A, p
1
A] ≡ IA where firms priced on the
boundary {(pA, pB) | pA ∈ [p0A, p1A], pB = W − pA} and were constrained:
∂pi(pA, pB)
∂pA
=
∂pi(pA, pB)
∂pB
= λ > 0.
Without loss of generality, suppose p0A < W/2 (otherwise p
0
B ≡ W − p0A < W/2 and
so relabel).
Separability, then, implies that no other firms price below this interval, as in-
creasing towards the boundary would increase profits. That is, if pA ∈ IA and
(pA, pB) ∈ suppFA,B then pA + pB = W and similarly for pB ∈ W − IA. As mass is
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distributed along a line with slope -1, the marginal distributions must move in lock
step. Thus, FA(pA)−FA(p0A) = FB(W−p0A)−FB(W−pA) and fA(pA) = fB(W−pA).
Looking again at the first order condition at the boundary, we have
N [nc+2ns(1−FA(pA))−2nsfA(pA)(pA−c)] = N [nc+2ns(1−FB(pB))−2nsfB(pB)(pB−c)].
Simplifying gives
FA(pA) + fA(pA)(pA − c) = FB(pB) + fB(pB)(pB − c).
Substitutiong in pB = W − pA and distributions gives
FA(pA) + fA(pA)(pA − c)
= −FA(pA) + (FA(p0A) + FB(W − p0A)) + fA(pA)(W − pA − c)
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Hence,
2FA(pA) + fA(pA)(2pA −W ) = (FA(p0A) + FB(W − p0A)).
∂
∂pA
(FA(pA)(2pA −W )) = (FA(p0A) + FB(W − p0A)).
=⇒ FA(pA)(2pA −W ) = (FA(p0A) + FB(W − p0A))pA + cons.
=⇒ FA(pA) = (FA(p
0
A) + FB(W − p0A))pA + cons
2pA −W .
This must also hold at p0A whereby one finds the constant from
cons = FA(p
0
A)(2p
0
A −W )− p0A(FB(W − p0A) + FA(p0A))
= FA(p
0
A)p
0
B − FB(p0B)p0A
where we have written p0B ≡ W −p0A. The final distribution required by equal profit
is then given by
FA(pA) =
(FA(p
0
A) + FB(p
0
B))pA + FA(p
0
A)p
0
B − FB(p0B)p0A
2pA −W .
This is not a distribution function as
dF
dpA
=
[
(FA(p
0
A) + FB(p
0
B))(2pA −W )
− 2((FA(p0A) + FB(p0B))pA + FA(p0A)p0B − FB(p0B)p0A)
]
(2pA −W )2 < 0
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for p0A < pA < W/2.
As boundary equilibria do not obtain, the marginal distribution given in propo-
sition 4.3.2 must obtain.
One should note that this is exactly the same marginal distribution derived in
Burdett and Judd (1983). This result is somewhat astounding – consumers’ ability
to economize on their search for several goods has no effect on the equilibrium price
distribution. As will prove clear below when q > 0 and n1 > 0, this derives from two
closely related artifacts of the homogeneous model: no consumer choose to search
again, and all firms price in the joint acceptance set. When some consumers must
search multiple times, their ability to economize on search costs via joint search will
alter the firm’s problem. There must, however, be some incentive driving multiple
search, an obvious example being the case where some firms sell only one good.
Proposition 4.3.2 only specifies the marginal distribution of prices, and so does
not exactly settle the question of existence, as we have yet to derive a joint distri-
bution of prices. This is easily settled. There exist a huge multiplicity of equilibria.
Indeed, any joint distribution with the given marginals and support contained in
the acceptance set will suffice. In the two good case, one easily derived example is
that of perfectly negative rank correlation in prices where firms price on the line
pB(pA) solving FA(pA) = 1− FB(pB(pA)). This yields
pB(pA) = c+ k
[
2
α
+
1
1− α log
(
2− α
α
)
− k
pA − c
]−1
.
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In this case, the joint distribution of prices is given by
FA,B(pA, pB) = max{0, FApA + FBpB − 1}.
A continuum of other possible equilibria exist.
One that generalizes to more than two goods (which the above perfect negative
rank correlation equilibrium does not) has support
{
(pA, pB) | pi ≥ p and pB ≤ c+ k
[
2
α
+
1
1− α log
(
2− α
α
)
− k
pA − c
]−1}
which is just the set above the lowest price and below the line of support from the
negative rank-correlation equilibrium above. The joint distribution is given by
FA,B(pA, pB) = 2
(
1−
√
F (pA)
)(
1−
√
F (pB)
)
−
(
max
{
1−
√
F (pA)−
√
F (pA), 0
})2
. (4.3.2)
The huge multiplicity of equilibria is at once positive and negative. While the
model gives no information about the joint distribution of prices – other than a lim-
itation on its support – this provides a justification for the common empirical focus
on marginal distribution of prices despite the presence of multiple products. Firms
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may play any of a continuum of joint distributions, but cost and other information
can be determined from just marginal distributions. Indeed, in this simplest case,
all of the parameters of the model except for N can be identified from the marginal
distributions of posted prices and the marginal distribution of paid prices. Both of
which are available from scanner data. We turn now to the more general case where
some firms offer but one product and some consumers demand but one good.
4.4 General Case
Suppose now that not all firms offer both goods, that q > 0. In this case, with
some firms offering only one good, some consumers will be forced to search again
– the sequential search option will operate. Moreover, this will lead some 2b’s to
make a single-good purchase, transitioning to become 1b’s so that n1 > 0. Assume
further that n01 > 0 so that there are some consumers demanding one good with
noisy search. Firms now have the option of targeting only captive single-product
searchers, pricing outside the joint acceptance set. For one-good firms, this boils
down to a decision between targeting both single and joint searchers by pricing
below Q, or pricing higher and selling only to 1b’s. It turns out, whether this
option is profitable depends less on the proportion of 1b’s than on the proportion of
one-good firms. If there are sufficiently few 1f’s so that there is “enough space” at
the bottom of the price distribution from section 4.3.2 for these firms to price below
Q. It’s only as q increases that deviations become profitable. There are several
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cases to consider, and each is taken in turn.
Equilibria fall into four cases. In the first, the proportion of one-good firms
is sufficiently small that are not directly constrained by the joint acceptance set
of consumers. That is, there is “enough room” at the bottom of the equilibrium
price distribution that one-good firms can price below Q and still make the same
profit on the good they sell as two-good firms do from each good. The marginal
distribution of prices is of the same form as in section 4.3.2. Two-good firms are
affected by one-good firms only in that their presence increases the reservation value
of consumers, as consumers are no longer able to satisfy their demand in the first
round of search.
In the second case, the proportion of one-good firms is sufficiently high that
they are constrained by Q, but not so high as to justify a jump to R. That is,
there are enough one-good firms that the marginal distribution of prices below Q is
higher than in the first case, and these firms would prefer to price above Q if joint
searchers would buy from them at these prices. In this second case, however, these
firms are not so constrained that it would be profitable to forsake joint searcher and
price at R, targeting only one-searchers. The large proportion of firms pricing below
Q has the effect of decreasing the highest price charged by two-good firms. There
are two reasons. The first is the obvious one – when some firms are constrained
to set low prices, the reservation value of consumers decreases. The second, and
more important, reason is that as the one-good firms crowd-out the bottom of the
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price distribution, two-good firms must increase their minimum prices. To remain
in the joint acceptance set, however, they must then decrease their maximum price,
moving from (R,Q) on the reservation frontier down to some point (p¯,W − p¯).
In the third case, there is such a high proportion of one-good firms that not all
can price below Q, some jump up to R to target single-product searchers. This has
the effect of
4.4.1 Few One-Good-Firms.
In the equilibrium of section 4.3.2, firms make constant profits per good for any
price between p and R. This was because a 2f pricing good A at R could price good
B at p ≤ Q and so still fall in the joint acceptance set of the 2b’s. 1f’s are not so
fortunate. As they sell but one good, and so implicitly have an infinite price for the
second, 2b’s will only buy from them at prices below Q.
If the proportion of one-sellers is low, equilibrium closely resembles the case
where all firms sell both goods. One-sellers simply set prices less than Q in order
to attract both one and two searchers. Both one-sellers and two-sellers make the
same profit from each product line they offer.
Proposition 4.4.1. Suppose q < q¯1 given below. Let X ≡ (nc + 2ns)/2ns. Then
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the marginal distribution of prices is given by
F (p) =

1− q if R ≤ p
X − (X − (1− q))
(
R−c
p−c
)
if c+ X−(1−q)
X
(R− c) ≤ p < R
0 if p < c+ X−(1−q)
X
(R− c).
Notice, this is an improper distribution as q firms do not offer one good, and so are
treated as offering a price at infinity. Given this, the expected price offered is
E[P |P ≤ R] = c+ k
1− q
Z
1− Z
where
Z ≡
(
X
1− q − 1
)
log
(
X
X − (1− q)
)
.
The reservation values of the consumer are given by
R =
k
1− q + E[P |P ≤ R],
W =
1 + q
1− qk + 2E[P |P ≤ R],
and
Q = W −R = q
1− qk + E[P |P ≤ R].
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Finally, q¯1 solves
q = F (Q) = X − X − (1− q)
q + (1− q)Z
which has no algebraic solution, but a solution exists and is unique.
Proof. Beginning with a one-searcher’s problem, the (1− q) firms who can offer the
good at a price less than R, and q firms can not offer the good at all so
R = k + (1− q)E[P |P ≤ R] + qR
which immediately gives our expression for R. The reservation value W is similar.
(1− 2q) firms will sell both goods to a two-searcher, and q sell each good (implying
that the consumer continues to search as a one-searcher with probability q). More-
over, any firm contacted will sell at least one good, so no two-searcher continues as
a two-searcher. These considerations along with linearity of expectation imply
W = k + 2(E[P |P ≤ R](1− q) + qR)
=
(
1 + q
1− q
)
k + 2E[P |P ≤ R]
where the last line obtains by substituting in for R. Q is simply W −R.
The profit firms make on a given good when pricing in the acceptance set are
pi(p) = [n1 + αn2︸ ︷︷ ︸
nc
+2 (1− α)n2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ns
(1− F (p))](p− c)
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Differentiating gives first order condition
0 = [nc + 2ns(1− F (p))]− 2nsf(p)(p− c).
Re-arranging gives
d
dp
[F (p)(p− c)] = X
so upon integrating
F (p)(p− c) = Xp+ cons.
Noting that F (R) = 1− q gives the value of the constant as
cons = −(X − (1− q))(R− c)−Xc
so that
F (p) = X − (X − (1− q))R− c
p− c .
The bottom of the support solves F (p) = 0 so that
p = c+
X − (1− q)
X
(R− c).
Continuing, given this distribution we calculate
F [p|P ≤ R] = X
1− q −
(
X
1− q − 1
)
R− c
p− c
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so that
E[P |P ≤ R] = R−
∫ R
p
X
1− q −
(
X
1− q − 1
)
R− c
p− c dp
= R− X
1− q (R− p) +
(
X
1− q − 1
)
(R− c) log
(
R− c
p− c
)
= c+
(
X
1− q − 1
)
(R− c) log
(
X
X − (1− q)
)
Finally, closing equilibrium, one simply substitutes the value of R into this equation
and solves for E[P |P ≤ R].
The value for q1 is the upper limit such that, given the above distribution, the
proportion of one-sellers is sufficiently small so that their population fits in the given
distribution below Q. For existence, one simply notes that at q = 0, F (Q) > 0 and
at q = 1, F (Q) < 1. For uniqueness, some time with a computer algebra system
yields
d
dq
F (Q) =
− 4(α− 1)
2n22q(
(n2(−2αq + α + 2q) + n1) log
(
n1−(α−2)n2
n2(−2αq+α+2q)+n1
)
− 2(α− 1)n2q
)2 < 0.
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4.4.2 Case 2: q¯1 < q ≤ q¯2
If the proportion of one-sellers is higher than will “fit naturally” below Q, but not
much higher, the one-sellers crowd each other below Q so as to be able to target
both one and two searchers. This crowding reduces their profit relative to two-
sellers. The crowding among one-sellers has the effect of displacing two-sellers –
there are “too many” firms charging at or below Q, so it is no longer profitable for
two-sellers to charge Q, higher prices are more profitable. But for a two-seller to
charge a higher price than Q on one good, the other good must be priced less than
R. Two-sellers move down along the reservation frontier, pricing in a range [p2, p¯2]
with p2 + p¯2 = W , moving in equilibrium to the point where equal profits are made
from both goods.
Proposition 4.4.2. Suppose q¯1 < q < q¯2 given below. Let X ≡ (nc + 2ns)/2ns.
Then the marginal distribution of prices is given by
F (p) =

1− q if p¯2 ≤ p
X − (X − (1− q))
(
p¯2−c
p−c
)
if p2 ≤ p < p¯2
q if Q ≤ p < p2
X − (X − q)
(
Q−c
p−c
)
if p1 ≤ p < Q
0 if p < p1.
Notice, this is an improper distribution as q firms do not offer one good, and so are
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treated as offering a price at infinity. The support for the two-sellers is [p2 < p¯2]
with
p¯2 =
W (nc + 2ns(1− q)− 2cns(1− 2q)
2(nc + ns)
p2 =
W (nc + 2nsq) + 2cns(1− 2q)
2(nc + ns)
.
The support for the one-sellers [p1, Q] with
p1 = c+
(
X − q
X
)
(Q− c).
The expected cost can be written as E[P |P ≤ R] = Ωk
Λk
k + Ωc
Λc
c with
Ωk = (n
c − 2ns(q − 1)) ·
(
2q(nc + ns) log
(
nc + 2ns
nc − 2nsq + 2ns
)
+(q + 1)(nc + 2nsq) log
(
nc − 2nsq + 2ns
nc + 2nsq
))
Λk = 2(q − 1)
((
(nc)2 + 2ncns − 4(ns)2(q − 1)q) log(nc − 2nsq + 2ns
nc + 2nsq
)
+2ns(q − 1)(nc + ns) + (nc + ns)(nc − 2ns(q − 1)) log
(
nc + 2ns
nc − 2nsq + 2ns
))
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Ωc =
(
(nc)2 + 2ncns − 4(ns)2(q − 1)q) log(nc − 2nsq + 2ns
nc + 2nsq
)
+ 2ns
(−ncq + 4nsq2 − 5nsq + ns)+ (nc + ns)(nc − 2ns(q − 1))
· log
(
nc + 2ns
nc − 2nsq + 2ns
)
Λc =
[
(nc)2 + 2ncns − 4(ns)2(q − 1)q] log(nc − 2nsq + 2ns
nc + 2nsq
)
+ 2ns(q − 1)(nc + ns) + (nc + ns)(nc − 2ns(q − 1)) log
(
nc + 2ns
nc − 2nsq + 2ns
)
Z ≡
(
X
1− q − 1
)
log
(
X
X − (1− q)
)
.
The reservation values of the consumer are given by
R =
k
1− q + E[P |P ≤ R],
W =
1 + q
1− qk + 2E[P |P ≤ R],
and
Q = W −R = q
1− qk + E[P |P ≤ R].
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Finally, q¯2 solves
[nc + 2ns(1− q)](Q− c) = max{n1(R− c), [n1 + 2ns(1− q)](p2 − c)}.
The left hand side is profit for a one-seller pricing at Q. The first term in the
maximand is the profit from pricing at R and selling only to (captive) one-searchers.
The second term in the maximand is the profit from pricing at p2 and selling to one-
searchers as well as all shopping two-searchers who also contact a two-seller or a
one-seller of the other good – both of which cases yield a basket price below W
resulting in a sale. This is precisely the condition that a 1f does not wish to deviate.
Proof. The reservation values follow from exactly the same argument as in Proposi-
tion 4.4.1. The values for p¯2 and p2 solve for equal profit along the line W = p¯2 +p2
and equal profit
[nc + 2ns(q)](p¯2 − c) = [nc + 2ns(1− q)](p2 − c)
as the highest price two-seller sells to a shopper only if that shopper faces another
firm not selling the good (q) and the lowest price two-seller sells to a shopper if they
have met either a firm not selling the good or another two-seller (who must have a
higher price). To see that two-sellers do not wish to price along pA + pB = W with
pA > p¯
2 recall that q < 1/2 and so the profit of the firm on the frontier (which is
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the only relevant region) is
[nc + 2nsq](p− c) + [nc + 2ns(1− q)](W − p− c)
is decreasing in p.
Given this distribution, we can find
F (p|P ≤ R) =

1 if p¯2 ≤ p
X
1−q − ( X1−q − 1)
(
p¯2−c
p−c
)
if p2 ≤ p < p¯2
q
1−q if Q ≤ p < p2
X
1−q − ( X1−q − q1−q )
(
Q−c
p−c
)
if p1 ≤ p < Q
0 if p < p1.
From this one derives
E[P |P ≤ R] = p¯2 −
(
X
1− q
)
(p¯2 − p2) +
(
X
1− q − 1
)
(p¯2 − c)
· log
(
nc + 2ns(1− q)
nc + 2nsq
)
−
(
q
1− q
)
(p2 −Q)−
(
q
1− q
)
(Q− c)
+
(
X
1− q −
q
1− q
)
(Q− c) log
(
X
X − q
)
Where the insides of the logs derive from manipulation of the distribution function
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which gives
p¯2 − c
p2 − c =
nc + 2ns(1− q)
nc + 2nsq
, and
Q− c
p1 − c =
X
X − q .
This expression for E[P |P ≤ R] is linear in R,W,Q and price limits. As these
are linear in E[P |P ≤ R] themselves, one may substitutes in the values for these
from above and solve. This produces the expression for the equilibrium value of
E[P |P ≤ R] given above in terms of parameters.
4.4.3 Case 3(a)
Which case obtains next may depend on parameters. As the proportion of one-
sellers increases above q¯2, one of two regions become profitable for the 1f. Either
pricing in a range contained in [p¯2, R] or between [Q, p
2]. Which is determined from
whether pricing at R and making nc1(R − c) is greater or less than pricing at p2
and making [nc1 + 2n
s(1 − q)](p2 − c). Clearly, this depends on the relative values
of nc1 and n
s. In this subsection, suppose there are relatively many nc1 so it is more
profitable to deviate above p¯2. Let r be the proportion of 1f’s pricing above p¯2
(with the complementary proportion 1− r still pricing below Q). The value of r is
determined by equal profit:
[nc + 2ns(1− (1− r)q)](Q− c) = βn1(R− c). (4.4.1)
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Of course, R and Q are endogenous and so this equation alone does not yield r.
Recall, that a 1f selling A and pricing above p¯2 face a profit function of
pi1(pA) = N [n
c
1 + 2n
s
1(1− FA(pA)) + 2ns2XA(pA)](p− c).
where, XA = FB(W − pA)− FA,B(pA,W − pA). In this case, a 1f pricing in [p¯2, R]
can make a basket with any 1f pricing below Q. Hence, XA = (1 − r)q and the
profit function is simply
pi1(pA) = N [n
c
1 + 2n
s
1(1− FA(pA)) + 2ns2(1− r)q](p− c).
Equal profit, requires, then, that the marginal distribution of prices follow a distri-
bution of
F = Y − [Y − (1− q)]R− c
p− c , where Y ≡
nc1 + 2n
s
2(1− r)q + 2ns1
2ns1
on the interval [pR, R] where pR is defined similarly to p1 with
pR = c+
Y − (1− q)
Y − (1− (1 + r)q)(R− c).
This implies that the 1f price according to
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G1(p) =

1 if R ≤ p
1
q
[
Y − [Y − (1− q)]R−c
p−c − (1− 2q)
]
if pR ≤ p < R
1− r if Q ≤ p < pR
1
q
[
X − (X − (1− r)q)Q−c
p−c
]
if p1 ≤ p < Q
0 if p < p1
As before, two-sellers will not price at (R,Q), but instead at a higher minimum
and lower maximum price solving p¯2 + p2 = W and equal profit. The equal profit
condition is
[nc + 2ns(1 + r)q](p¯2 − c) = [nc + 2ns(1− (1− r)q)](p2 − c).
Solving gives
p¯2 =
W (nc + 2ns[1− (1− r)q])− 2nsc(1− 2q)
2[nc + ns(1 + 2rq)]
,
p2 =
W (nc + 2ns(1 + r)q)− 2nsc(1− 2q)
2[nc + ns(1 + 2rq)]
.
So, 2f’s price on the set {(pA, pB)|p2 ≤ pi ≤ p¯2 and pA + pB ≤ W} with marginal
distribution
G2(p,∞) = 1
1− 2q
[
X − [X − (1− (1 + r)q)] p¯
2 − c
p− c − (1− r)q
]
.
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As above, any joint distribution on this set with the required marginals suffices as
an equilibrium.
Adding these two gives the marginal distribution of prices in equilibrium, re-
quired by equal profit conditions:
F (p) =

1− q if R ≤ p
Y − [Y − (1− q)]R−c
p−c if p
R ≤ p < R
1− (1 + r)q if p¯2 ≤ p < pR
X − [X − (1− (1 + r)q)] p¯2−c
p−c if p
2 ≤ p < p¯2
(1− r)q if Q ≤ p < p2
X − (X − (1− r)q)Q−c
p−c if p
1 ≤ p < Q
0 if p < p1
From this we calculate
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F (p|P ≤ R) =

1 if R ≤ p
Y
1−q − [ Y1−q − 1]R−cp−c if p1 ≤ p < R
1−(1+r)q
1−q if p¯
2 ≤ p < p1
X
1−q − [ X1−q − 1−(1+r)q1−q ] p¯
2−c
p−c if p
2 ≤ p < p¯2
(1−r)q
1−q if Q ≤ p < p2
X
1−q − ( X1−q − (1−r)q1−q )Q−cp−c if p1 ≤ p < Q
0 if p < p1
Next we calculate expected price in terms of endogenous variables:
E[P |P ≤ R] = R− Y
1− q (R− p
R)
+
[
Y
1− q − 1
]
(R− c) log
(
Y − (1− (1 + r)q)
Y − (1− q)
)
− 1− (1 + r)q
1− q (p
R − p¯2)
− X
1− q (p¯
2 − p2) +
[
X
1− q −
1− (1 + r)q
1− q
]
(p¯2 − c) log
(
X − (1− r)q
X − (1− (1 + r)q)
)
− (1− r)q
1− q (p
2 −Q)− X
1− q (Q− p
1)
+
(
X
1− q −
(1− r)q
1− q
)
(Q− c) log
(
X
X − (1− r)q
)
.
The reservation value of a one-searcher is as before (because 1 − q price at or
below R):
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R =
k
1− q + E[P |P ≤ R].
The reservation value of the 2b differs as they do not buy from the 2rq 1f’s pricing
above Q. Of firms that do sell, 1 − 2q sell both goods, and 2(1 − r)q sell but one
good, forcing the consumer to continue searching for the other. These considerations
along with linearity of expectation gives
W = k + 2(E[P |P < R] P(P < R) + (1− r)qR) + 2rqW.
Noting that
E[P |P < R] P(P < R) = E[P |P ≤ R] P(P ≤ R)−RP(P = R)
with P(P = R) = rq and P(P ≤ R) = 1− q gives
W = k + 2(E[P |P ≤ R](1− q)− rqR + (1− r)qR) + 2rqW
= k + 2
(
E[P |P ≤ R](1− q) + (1− 2r)q
(
k
1− q + E[P |P ≤ R]
))
+ 2rqW
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so
(1− 2rq)W =
[
1 + 2
(1− 2r)q
1− q
]
k + 2(1− 2rq)E[P |P ≤ R]
=⇒ W =
(
1 + q − 4rq
(1− q)(1− 2rq)
)
k + 2E[P |P ≤ R].
Finally,
Q = W −R =
(
(1− 2r)q
(1− q)(1− 2rq)
)
k + E[P |P ≤ R].
Substituting these into the expression for E[P |P ≤ R] and solving gives
E[P |P ≤ R] = Ωk
Λk
k +
Ωc
Λc
c
where
Ωk = −
2(β(2q − 3)− 2q) log
(
β(3−2q(r+1))+2q(r+1)
3β
)
β − 1 −
2(β + 2)
β − 1
− 2q(r − 1)(q(4r − 1)− 1)(n
c + 2nsq(r + 1))
(2qr − 1)(nc + 2nsqr + ns) +
2q(2r − 1)(nc + 2ns)
ns(2qr − 1)
− 2(n
c + 2ns)(q(4r − 1)− 1)(nc + 2nsq(r + 1))
ns(2qr − 1)(nc + 2nsqr + ns)
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+
(nc + 2ns)(q(4r − 1)− 1)(nc + 2ns(q(r − 1) + 1))
ns(2qr − 1)(nc + 2nsqr + ns)
+
2(qr + q − 1)(q(4r − 1)− 1)(nc + 2ns(q(r − 1) + 1))
(2qr − 1)(nc + 2nsqr + ns)
−
2q(2r − 1)(nc + 2ns(q(r − 1) + 1)) log
(
nc+2ns
nc+2ns(q(r−1)+1)
)
ns(2qr − 1)
−
(q(4r − 1)− 1)(nc + 2ns(r + 1))(nc + 2ns(q(r − 1) + 1)) log
(
nc+2ns(q(r−1)+1)
nc+2nsq(r+1)
)
ns(2qr − 1)(nc + 2nsqr + ns)
+
4q2(r − 1)(2r − 1)
2qr − 1 + 4(q − 1)
Λk = 2(q − 1)
−(β(2q − 3)− 2q) log
(
β(3−2q(r+1))+2q(r+1)
3β
)
β − 1 +
β + 2
1− β
− 2(n
c + 2ns)(nc + 2nsq(r + 1))
ns(nc + 2nsqr + ns)
− 2q(r − 1)(n
c + 2nsq(r + 1))
nc + 2nsqr + ns
+
(nc + 2ns)(nc + 2ns(q(r − 1) + 1))
ns(nc + 2nsqr + ns)
+
2(qr + q − 1)(nc + 2ns(q(r − 1) + 1))
nc + 2nsqr + ns
−
(nc + 2ns(q(r − 1) + 1)) log
(
nc+2ns
nc+2ns(q(r−1)+1)
)
ns
−
(nc + 2ns(r + 1))(nc + 2ns(q(r − 1) + 1)) log
(
nc+2ns(q(r−1)+1)
nc+2nsq(r+1)
)
ns(nc + 2nsqr + ns)
+
nc
ns
+ 2q(r − 1) + 2
)
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Ωc =
(
β + 2
2(1− β)(1− q) − 1
)
log
(
β+2
2(1−β) + q(r + 1)− 1
β+2
2(1−β) − 1
)
− n
sq(1− 2q)(1− r)
(1− q)(nc + ns(2qr + 1)) +
ns(1− 2q)(1− q(r + 1))
(1− q)(nc + ns(2qr + 1))
+
(1− 2q)(nc + 2ns)
2(1− q)(nc + ns(2qr + 1)) +
ns(1− 2q)
(
nc+2ns
2ns(1−q) +
r
1−q
)
log
(
nc+2ns
2ns
−q(1−r)
nc+2ns
2ns
+q(r+1)−1
)
nc + ns(2qr + 1)
+
(
nc + 2ns
2ns(1− q) −
q(1− r)
1− q
)
log
(
nc + 2ns
2ns
(
nc+2ns
2ns
− q(1− r))
)
+
(
nc + 2ns
2ns(1− q) +
r
1− q
)
log
( nc+2ns
2ns
− q(1− r)
nc+2ns
2ns
+ q(r + 1)− 1
)
Λc =
(
β + 2
2(1− β)(1− q) − 1
)
log
(
β+2
2(1−β) + q(r + 1)− 1
β+2
2(1−β) − 1
)
− β + 2
2(1− β)(1− q)
− (n
c + 2ns)(nc + 2ns(1− q(1− r)))
2ns(1− q)(nc + ns(2qr + 1)) +
(1− q(r + 1))(nc + 2ns(1− q(1− r)))
(1− q)(nc + ns(2qr + 1))
− q(1− r)(n
c + 2nsq(r + 1))
(1− q)(nc + ns(2qr + 1)) +
(nc + 2ns)(nc + 2nsq(r + 1))
ns(1− q)(nc + ns(2qr + 1))
+
(
nc + 2ns
2ns(1− q) −
q(1− r)
1− q
)
log
(
nc + 2ns
2ns
(
nc+2ns
2ns
− q(1− r))
)
+
(nc + 2ns(1− q(1− r)))
(
nc+2ns
2ns(1−q) +
r
1−q
)
log
(
nc+2ns
2ns
−q(1−r)
nc+2ns
2ns
+q(r+1)−1
)
nc + ns(2qr + 1)
− n
c + 2ns
2ns(1− q) +
q(1− r)
1− q .
Substituting this back into R, W , andQ and then these into F gives the marginal
distributions. Finally, the equal profit condition (4.4.1) gives r. Notice, there must
exist an interior (0 < r < 1) solution. By assumption, r = 0 implies the RHS is
strictly greater (which is why we consider this case). But r = 1 is not a solution,
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as then Q = R so that the LHS is strictly greater.
4.4.4 Case 3(b)
In the previous case, q > q¯2 and pi1(R) > pi1(p
2) so that some 1f’s priced above the
2f’s. Suppose instead that pi1(R) < pi1(p2) so that it is profitable for 1f’s to price
just below the 2f’s. This occurs when nc1 is relatively small, so that targeting only
1b’s at R is not profitable. A 1f pricing at p2 sells to one-searchers, but also to
two-searchers in contact with a 2f or a 1f selling the other good. That is, Xi(pi) > 0
and specifically Xi = (1− q) for p ∈ [Q, p2]. This gives a profit of
pi1(pA) = N [n
c
1 + 2n
s
1(1− FA(pA)) + 2ns2(1− q)](p− c).
Write l for the proportion of one-firms pricing in (Q, p2). Write
Yl =
nc1 + 2n
s
2(1− q) + 2ns1
2ns1
.
Equal profit for the 1f pricing in this region requires the aggregate marginal distri-
bution of prices to be
F = Yl − (Yl − q)
p2 − c
p− c
As above, one can derive the lower bound of the 1f’s prices in this region as
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pl = c+
Yl − q
Yl − (1− l)q (p
2 − c).
so that the 1f price according to
G1(p) =

1 if p2 ≤ p
1
q
[
Yl − (Yl − (1− r)q)p
2−c
p−c
]
if pl ≤ p < p2
(1− l) if Q ≤ p < pl
1
q
[
X − (X − (1− r)q)Q−c
p−c
]
if p1 ≤ p < Q
0 if p < p1
As in Case 2, the 2f’s will shade down the reservation frontier. The equal profit
condition determining p2 and p¯2 is exactly the same as in Case 2, as all 1f’s price
below p2. Further, the aggregate marginal distribution required for equal profit
among the 2f’s is the same. Hence, the marginal distribution of prices among the
2f is simply
G2(p,∞) =

1 if p¯2 ≤ p
1
1−2q
[
X − (X − (1− q)) p¯2−c
p−c − q
]
if p2 ≤ p < p
0 if p < p2.
with
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p¯2 =
W (nc + 2ns(1− q)− 2cns(1− 2q)
2(nc + ns)
p2 =
W (nc + 2nsq) + 2cns(1− 2q)
2(nc + ns)
.
Again, any joint distribution with these marginals and support contained in
{(pA, pB)| pA + pB ≤ W and p2 ≤ pi ≤ p¯2}
will suffice.
Continuing, these add to an aggregate marginal distribution of
F (p) =

1− q if p¯2 ≤ p
X − (X − (1− q)) p¯2−c
p−c if p
2 ≤ p < p¯2
Yl − (Yl − q)p
2−c
p−c if p
l ≤ p < p2
(1− l)q if Q ≤ p < pl
X − (X − (1− l)q)Q−c
p−c if p
1 ≤ p < Q.
.
This gives a conditional price distribution
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F (p|P ≤ R) =

1 if p¯2 ≤ p
X
1−q − ( X1−q − 1) p¯
2−c
p−c if p
2 ≤ p < p¯2
Yl
1−q − ( Yl1−q − q1−q )
p2−c
p−c if p
l ≤ p < p2
(1−l)q
1−q if Q ≤ p < pl
X
1−q −
(
X
1−q − (1−l)q)1−q
)
Q−c
p−c if p
1 ≤ p < Q.
.
Integrating this gives expected acceptable prices for a 1b:
E[p|P ≤ R] = p¯2−
(
X
1− q
)
(p¯2−p2)+
(
X
1− q − 1
)
(p¯2−c) log
(
nc + 2ns(1− q)
nc + 2nsq
)
−
(
Yl
1− q
)
(p2 − pl) +
(
Yl
1− q −
q
1− q
)
(p2 − c) log
(
Yl − (1− l)q
Yl − q
)
−
(
(1− l)q
1− q
)
(pl −Q)−
(
X
1− q
)
(Q− p1)
+
(
X
1− q −
(1− l)q
1− q
)
(Q− c) log
(
X
X − (1− l)q
)
(4.4.2)
Reservation values are calculated similarly to case 3(a). The 1b buy from all
firms offering their desired goods so that
R =
k
1− q + E[P |P ≤ R].
The 2b’s buy the offered good from 1f’s pricing below Q, continuing to search for
132
the other good, and buy both goods from 2f’s
W = k + 2
(∫ Q
p1
pdF (p) + (1− l)qR+
∫ p¯2
p2
pdF (p)
)
+ 2lqW
= k + 2
[
Q(1− l)q −X(Q− p1) + (X − (1− l)q)(Q− c) log
(
X
X − (1− l)q
)
+ (1− l)qR+ p¯2(1− q)− p2q −X(p¯2 − p2)
+(X − (1− q))(p¯2 − c) log
(
X − q
X − (1− q)
)]
+ 2lqW.
Substituting in Q = W − R, the various prices, and the value of R gives W =
ΩW/ΛW where
ΩW =
−
2((l − 1)q +X)(c(q − 1) + E[P |P ≤ R]q − E[P |P ≤ R]− k) log
(
X
(l−1)q+X
)
q − 1
− 8cn
sq2
nc + ns
−
2c(q +X − 1)(nc − 2ns(q − 1)) log
(
X−q
q+X−1
)
nc + ns
+
8cnsq
nc + ns
− 2cn
s
nc + ns
+ 2cq + 2E[P |P ≤ R]q − 2kq
q − 1 + k (4.4.3)
ΛW = −2((l − 1)q +X) log
(
X
(l − 1)q +X
)
+ 2(l − 1)q − 2lq
−
(q +X − 1)(nc + 2nsq) log
(
X−q
q+X−1
)
nc + ns
+
q(nc + 2nsq)
nc + ns
+
(q − 1)(nc + 2nsq)
nc + ns
+ 2(q −X) + 2X + 1. (4.4.4)
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Taking these and substituting in to E[P |P ≤ R] and solving gives
E[P |P ≤ R] = Ωk
Λk
k +
Ωc
Λc
c
where
Ωk = (
(q + Yl − 1)(nc + 2nsq) log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− q(nc + ns)
)
· 2((l − 1)q +X) log
(
X
(l − 1)q +X
)
+ ((2l−1)q−1)(q+X−1)(nc + 2nsq) log
(
X − q
q +X − 1
)
−ncq2 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 2lncq2 − ncqYl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ nc log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− ncYl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ 2lncq − 2nsq3 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 8lnsq3 − 2nsq2Yl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ 6lnsq2 + 2nsq log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 2nsqYl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ 2ncq2 + ncq − nc + 4nsq3 + 2nsq2 − 2nsq
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Λk = 2(q − 1)· [
((l − 1)q +X) log
(
X
(l − 1)q +X
)
·
(
(q + Yl − 1)(nc + 2nsq) log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− nc − ns
)
+ (lq − 1)(q +X − 1)(nc + 2nsq) log
(
X − q
q +X − 1
)
− ncq2 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ ncq log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− ncqYl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 2nsq3 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 4lnsq3 + 2nsq2 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
−2nsq2Yl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ 4lnsq2 − lnsq + ncq + 4nsq2 − 3nsq + ns
]
Ωc = (q +X − 1) log
(
X − q
q +X − 1
)(
nc(lq − 1) + 2ns (−3lq2 + 2lq + q − 1))
− ((l − 1)q +X) log
(
X
(l − 1)q +X
)
·
(
−(q + Yl − 1)(nc + ns(4− 6q)) log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ nc + ns
)
− ncq2 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ ncq log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− ncqYl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 2nsq3 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ 12lnsq3 + 6nsq2 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 2nsq2Yl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 12lnsq2 − 6nsq log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ 4nsqYl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ 2ns log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 2nsYl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ 3lnsq + ncq − 4nsq2 + 5nsq − ns
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Λc = ((l − 1)q +X) log
(
X
(l − 1)q +X
)
·
(
(q + Yl − 1)(nc + 2nsq) log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− nc − ns
)
+ (lq − 1)(q +X − 1)(nc + 2nsq) log
(
X − q
q +X − 1
)
− ncq2 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ ncq log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− ncqYl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 2nsq3 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 4lnsq3 + 2nsq2 log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
− 2nsq2Yl log
(
− lq − q + Yl
q − Yl
)
+ 4lnsq2
− lnsq + ncq + 4nsq2 − 3nsq + ns.
Substituting back E[P |P ≤ R] gives all variables in terms of exogenous variables
and l. As r did in case 3(a), l then solves the equal profit condition pi1(Q) = pi1(p2)
which has no algebraic solution. If there is no solution, then l = 1 so that no firm
prices below Q which may be possible.
4.4.5 Case 4
In both case 3(a) and case 3(b), some 1f’s priced above Q, either above the 2f’s or
below them. The next possibility is that both obtain. This would occur if, when
calculating equilibrium profits in case 3(a) we have pi1(p2) > pi1(R) or when calcu-
lating equilibrium profits in case 3(b) we have pi1(R) > pi1(p2). Now, a proportion
r of the 1f’s will price in a range [pr, R] with p2 < pr, a proportion l of the 1f’s will
price in a range [pl, p2] with Q < pl, and a complementary proportion 1− l− r price
below Q. Again, the 2f price in some range [p2, p¯2] with p2 + p¯2 = W and equal
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profit.
What will distinguish this case from case 5 below is that we assume that the
ranges below R and p2 are sufficiently tight that the two groups do not complete
baskets for each other. That is, we construct equilibrium under the assumption
that pr + pl > W so that a noisy searcher in contact with both an l firm and an r
firm will not buy from either.
In this case profit for the 1f in the relevant regions is given by
pi1(p) =

N [nc1 + 2n
s
2(1− l − r)q + 2ns1(1− F (p))](p− c) if p¯2 ≤ p ≤ R
N [nc1 + 2n
s
1(1− F (p)) + 2ns2(1− (1 + r)q)](p− c) if Q < p ≤ p2
N [nc + 2ns(1− F (p))](p− c) if p ≤ Q
where the second line reflects the fact that a 1f pricing between Q and p2 will sell
to a 2b who is in contact with either a 2f or a 1f selling the other good and pricing
below p2.
Similar considerations as in cases 3(a) and 3(b) above imply that the marginal
distribution of prices is given by
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F (p) =

1− q if R ≤ p
Y − [Y − (1− q)]R−c
p−c if p
r ≤ p < R
1− (1 + r)q if p¯2 ≤ p < pr
X − [X − (1− (1 + r)q)] p¯2−c
p−c if p
2 ≤ p < p¯2
Yl − [Yl − (1− r)q]p
2−c
p−c if p
l ≤ p < p2
(1− l − r)q if Q ≤ p < pl
X − [X − (1− l − r)q]Q−c
p−c if p
1 ≤ p < Q
where now
Yl = (n
c
1 + 2n
s
2(1− (1 + r)q) + 2ns1)/(2ns1)
and,
Y = (nc1 + 2n
s
2(1− l − r)q + 2ns1)/(2ns1).
The price bounds for the 2f are the same as in case 3(a)
p¯2 =
W (nc + 2ns[1− (1− r)q])− 2nsc(1− 2q)
2[nc + ns(1 + 2rq)]
,
p2 =
W (nc + 2ns(1 + r)q)− 2nsc(1− 2q)
2[nc + ns(1 + 2rq)]
.
2f’s price with marginal distribution:
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G2(p,∞) =

1 if p¯2 ≤ p
1
1−2q
[
X − [X − (1− (1 + r)q)] p¯2−c
p−c − (1− r)q
]
if p2 ≤ p < p¯2
0 if p < p2
on the set {(pA, pB)|p2 ≤ pi ≤ p¯2 and pA + pB ≤ W}. As above, any joint distribu-
tion with support contained in this set with the required marginals suffices as an
equilibrium.
The distribution played by the 1f’s, is just (F − (1− 2q)G2)/q which is given by
G1(p) =

1 if R ≤ p
1
q
[
Y − [Y − (1− q)]R−c
p−c − (1− 2q)
]
if pr ≤ p < R
1− r if p2 ≤ p < pr
1
q
[
Yl − [Yl − (1− r)q]p
2−c
p−c
]
if pl ≤ p < p2
1− l − r if Q ≤ p < pl
1
q
[
X − [X − (1− l − r)q]Q−c
p−c
]
if p1 ≤ p < Q.
Where the price termini are given by
pr = c+
Y − (1− q)
Y − 1− (1 + r)q (R− c),
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pl = c+
Yl − (1− r)q
Yl − (1− l − r)q (p
2 − c),
and
p1 = c+
X − (1− l − r)q
X
(Q− c).
Turn now to the consumers’ reservation values. As above, the reservation value
for 1b’s is straightforward.
R =
k
1− q + E[P |P ≤ R].
To calculate E[P |P ≤ R], first we derive the conditional price distribution:
F (p|P ≤ R) =

1 if R ≤ p
Y
1−q − [ Y1−q − 1]R−cp−c if pr ≤ p < R
1−(1+r)q
1−q if p¯
2 ≤ p < pr
X
1−q − [ X1−q − (1−(1+r)q)1−q ] p¯
2−c
p−c if p
2 ≤ p < p¯2
Yl
1−q − [ Yl1−q − (1−r)q1−q ]
p2−c
p−c if p
l ≤ p < p2
(1−l−r)q
1−q if Q ≤ p < pl
X
1−q − [ X1−q − (1−l−r)q1−q ]Q−cp−c if p1 ≤ p < Q.
In terms of endogenous variables, the expected price is
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E[P |P ≤ R] = R− Y
1− q (R− p
R)
+
[
Y
1− q − 1
]
(R− c) log
(
Y − (1− (1 + r)q)
Y − (1− q)
)
− 1− (1 + r)q
1− q (p
R − p¯2)− X
1− q (p¯
2 − p2)
+
[
X
1− q −
1− (1 + r)q
1− q
]
(p¯2 − c) log
(
X − (1− r)q
X − (1− (1 + r)q)
)
−
(
Yl
1− q
)
(p2 − pl) +
(
Yl
1− q −
(1− r)q
1− q
)
(p2 − c) log
(
Yl − (1− l − r)q
Yl − (1− r)q
)
−
(
(1− l)q
1− q
)
(pl −Q)− (1− l − r)q
1− q (p
l −Q)−
(
X
1− q
)
(Q− p1)
+
(
X
1− q −
(1− l − r)q
1− q
)
(Q− c) log
(
X
X − (1− l − r)q
)
. (4.4.5)
As for W , the 2b’s still buy only from 1f’s with p ≤ Q (whom they meet with
probability (1− l− r)q) whereupon they continue as a 1b, and also from 2f’s. This
yields a similar expression to case 3(b).
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W = k + 2
(∫ Q
p1
pdF (p) + (1− l − r)qR +
∫ p¯2
p2
pdF (p)
)
+ 2(l + r)qW
= k + 2
[
Q(1− l − r)q −X(Q− p1)
+(X − (1− l − r)q)(Q− c) log
(
X
X − (1− l − r)q
)
+ (1− l − r)qR + p¯2(1− (1 + r)q)− p2(1− r)q −X(p¯2 − p2)
+(X − (1− (1 + r)q))(p¯2 − c) log
(
X − (1− r)q
X − (1− (1 + r)q)
)]
+ 2(l + r)qW.
As above, one can plug in Q = W − R and R and obtain an expression for W
in terms of parameters and E[P |P ≤ R]. Plugging the resulting value of W , prices,
etc. into E[P |P ≤ R] leads to a linear equation in E[P |P ≤ R], k, and c, ultimately
resulting in an equation for E[P |P ≤ R], W , and R which are linear functions of
k and c in terms of parameters and l and r. The exact expressions are too long to
print. Finally, as in previous cases, the values for l and r derive from equal profit:
p¯i1 = pi1(R), p¯i1 = pi1(p2), and p¯i1 = pi1(Q).
But these do not have algebraic solution.
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4.4.6 Case 5
The last case to consider is similar to case 4, but now some 1f’s above Q can make
baskets with one another. In this case, the 1f’s price in the same three ranges as in
case 4: [p1, Q], [pl, p2], and [pr, R]. Here, now, pr + pl < W so that Xi(p) is not a
constant. In this case, firms care not just about their rank in the distribution, but
also the proportion of firms who can make a basket with them. Write
pˆl ≡ W − pr and pˆr ≡ W − pl.
The profit function for the 1f becomes
pi1(p) =

N [nc1 + 2n
s
1(1− F (p)) + 2ns2(1− l − r)q](p− c) if pˆr ≤ p ≤ R
N [nc1 + 2n
s
1(1− F (p)) + 2ns2F (W − p)](p− c) if pr ≤ p < pˆr
N [nc1 + 2n
s
1(1− F (p)) + 2ns2(1− (1 + r)q)](p− c) if pˆl < p ≤ p2
N [nc1 + 2n
s
1(1− F (p)) + 2ns2F (W − p)](p− c) if pl ≤ p < pˆl
N [nc + 2ns(1− F (p))](p− c) if p ≤ Q.
The derivation of F is the same as above for the first, third, and fifth cases. But the
second and third are interdependent and so we proceed slightly differently. Suppose
p ∈ [pr, pˆr] so that p′ ≡ W − p ∈ [pl, pˆl]. Equal profit requires
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(nc1 + 2n
2
1(1− F (p)) + 2ns2F (p′))(p− c)
= (nc1 + 2n
2
1(1− F (p′)) + 2ns2F (p))(p′ − c)
which gives
F (p′) = F (p)
(
ns2W − (ns2 + ns1)c+ (ns1 − ns2)p
ns1W − (ns1 + ns2)c+ (ns2 − ns1)p
)
+
(nc1 + 2n
s
1)(W − 2p)
2ns1W − 2(ns1 + ns2)c+ 2(ns2 − ns1)p
.
Substituting this into pi1(p) = p¯i1 and solving gives
F (p) =
p¯i1 −N
(
nc1 + 2n
s
1 + 2n
s
2
(
(nc1+2n
s
1)(W−2p)
2ns1W−2(ns1+ns2)c+2(ns2−ns1)p
))
(p− c)
N
(
2ns2
(
ns2W−(ns2+ns1)c+(ns1−ns2)p
ns1W−(ns1+ns2)c+(ns2−ns1)p
)
− 2ns1
)
(p− c)
.
Notice that the expression is exactly the same for p ∈ [pl, pˆl]. Finally, p¯i1 can easily
be read off from pi(R) = N [nc1 +2n
s
2(1− l−r)q](R−c) so that for p ∈ [pl, pˆl]∪ [pr, pˆr]
F (p) = H(p) ≡
[nc1 + 2n
s
2(1− l − r)q](R− c)
−
(
nc1 + 2n
s
1 + 2n
s
2
(
(nc1+2n
s
1)(W−2p)
2ns1W−2(ns1+ns2)c+2(ns2−ns1)p
))
(p− c)(
2ns2
(
ns2W−(ns2+ns1)c+(ns1−ns2)p
ns1W−(ns1+ns2)c+(ns2−ns1)p
)
− 2ns1
)
(p− c)
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Given this, we can solve for pr and pl as
F (pr) = 1− (1 + r)q and F (pl) = (1− l − r)q.
These equations are quadratic in p and so have two roots. It is not clear whether
this delivers true multiplicity or whether one solution or another is false. I would
conjecture that only the smaller roots satisfy equilibrium, but this requires more
investigation. The other limits, p1, p¯2, and p2 are given as in case 4. Equal profit,
then, requires the following marginal distribution of prices.
F (p) =

1− q if R ≤ p
Y − [Y − (1− q)]R−c
p−c if pˆ
r ≤ p < R
H(p) if pr ≤ p < pˆr
1− (1 + r)q if p¯2 ≤ p < pr
X − [X − (1− r)q] p¯2−c
p−c if p
2 ≤ p < p¯2
Yl − [Yl − (1− r)q]p
2−c
p−c if pˆ
l ≤ p < p2
H(p) if pl ≤ p < pˆl
(1− l − r)q if Q ≤ p < pl
X − [X − (1− l − r)q]Q−c
p−c if p
1 ≤ p < Q
The 2f’s follow the same marginal distribution as in case 4, and the 1f’s, then,
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set G1(p) = (F (p)− (1− 2q)G2(p,∞))/q. Reservation values take exactly the same
form as in case 4, and E[P |P ≤ R] integrates just as above, but it is no longer
a linear equation in c and k because of the radicals involved in pl and pr. An
equilibrium, then, only requires solving for r and l which follows from equal profit
as above. This case is, perhaps the most interesting and also the most bedevilling.
More investigation is required.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper considered equilibrium in a model of multi-product retailing and se-
quential search. In a simple case where all firms can offer all goods, equilibrium
very closely mirrors that of single product search. This obtains in equilibrium as
a direct result of the fact that, while profit per good depends on one’s rank in the
price distribution for that good, overall profits are separable in price.
If not all firms offer both goods, but the number who do not is small, a similar
result holds. The marginal distributions are of exactly the same form as would
obtain in a single product model, except consumers reservation values are increased
to reflect the extra search cost entailed in visiting multiple stores.
As the proportion of firms who can not sate the consumers’ demand increases,
an interesting effect obtains. Single-product firms must price at the bottom of the
distribution for two-good buyers to demand from them. Bunching up at the bottom
of the distribution induces two-good firms to raise prices – but prices can not be
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raised on both goods beyond the reservation curve of consumers. These firms, then,
cut their price, reducing the highest price charged in equilibrium.
Several other cases are possible as fewer and fewer firms offer both goods. The
most interesting concerns the case where single-product firms make baskets for each
other. Two-good demanders have a maximum price they will pay for the basket of
two goods which is higher than twice the price at which they will buy individual
goods. As noisy search allows consumers to contact two firms at once, a one-good
firm can set a price at which they could not sell by themselves, but at which they
will sell if the consumer is in contact with another firm offering a sufficient low
price. That is if two firms can together make a basket. This produces a truly global
pricing problem different not just in form but also in kind from the standard model.
This case requires further investigation.
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